Page:The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects.djvu/64

 ." Wallace (l. c.) adopts precisely the same attitude.

Green intended, beyond any reasonable doubt, a rehabilitation of Logic and Metaphysics as against Psychology and Theory of Knowledge considered as independent sciences. He proceeds, as we all do, not by prior assumptions of premisses for demonstration—a method, I should contend, impossible for a sound logician, and Green was an exceedingly sound one—but by trying to construct a conception which would most completely harmonise with the facts and so afford the completest theoretical satisfaction. Of course, he did not deny the existence of externality, not even of unconscious externality. He held, however the conviction, in which I agree with him, that you could not have a world without consciousness as its centre. Here, I am glad to understand, the new realist primarily differs because he supposes any view like Green's to be an unwarranted assumption ab initio. He