Page:The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects.djvu/61

 was the continual collision between its statements, and passages which crowded into my mind in which Green, Wallace, and Mr. Bradley—to mention no more than these—seemed most sharply and in their whole aim and method to dissociate themselves from what I understand by Epistemology. According to my understanding and conviction, the whole movement from Hegel downwards, and most explicitly Green's contribution to the movement in England, was a revolution against psychological idealism and epistemology, having much in common with what the realists are now more emphatically attempting. My view of the situation was expressed in 1885, when I said that the plan of the great masters has been handed over to be carried out piecemeal by the journeymen; and I still believe this view to be sound. If I could transfer, for example, into this Appendix a couple of pages from Wallace's "Introductory Essays" to Hegel's "Philosophy of Mind," I really