Page:The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects.djvu/43

 and pleasure are sense-contents or not, I think it has been proved impossible to separate them in treatment from sense-contents either as elements of feeling or as objects of emotion. You must either assign sense-contents to the mind, or æsthetic contents to physical reality.

(iii.) We have been pursuing throughout the idea of continuity in kind between mind and its objects. It has appeared to us that as long as a severance prevails, a just estimate of reality-values is impossible. On the one side we have a caput mortuum; on the other an empty synthetic function.

The twentieth-century realism which has been our guide has carried out this idea of continuity up to the penultimate step. Great as seemed to be its advance beyond eclectic or materialistic realisms, it still seemed to us to fail in discarding the last trace of eclecticism. And therefore we asked ourselves if it was not, for some reason of principle, unable to complete its portrayal of a reality at once solid and vital. And the reason which