Page:The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects.djvu/34

 world, not as an object in a world. I think "the tree is there, in the panorama," and the panorama is essential to my mind, though my mind has more before it, e.g., thoughts of other places, and of incidents at other times. I am describing facts. I am not making any argument that the existence of the objects is in my mind or is mind-dependent. I am merely stating what I am directly aware of. In describing my awareness there is always an "and" or a "before"—or "behind" or "beside"—some conjunction or preposition. It is never just one object aware of one other.

The kind of observation this suggests to me is that ab initio one kind of thing is a whole, and another is a fragment. A mind is a whole, that is in its nature and intent; an object is a fragment. This fact forebodes a difficulty in assessing the reality of objects apart from mind, and so in drawing a line between them. For what is real must surely be a whole, whatever else may be its character. We shall see reason to return to this point.