Page:The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects.djvu/28

 arrangements or motions of whatever constituents we regard as ultimate. But it cannot be too often repeated, for those who are likely to forget the lesson, that extension and motion or material substance are in themselves on the same immediate footing as colours and smells; that they, too, are made up of sensa and percepta and thoughts, and exhibit the same problem of presenting these features in their combination."

I must observe, however, at this point, that while materialistic prejudice is thus thoroughly repudiated as regards the secondary qualities of things, I cannot see how the tertiary qualities, say, for example, those which we call æsthetic, can have justice done them on this principle. Can they escape being regarded as distinctively psychical and so far of inferior reality, so long as even feeling is reserved as something belonging to mind? This remark anticipates our later argument, to the effect that thorough and solid as this new realism attempts to be,