Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/69

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Because, Socrates, they are the same.

Very likely, I said; but I remain as stupid as ever; for still I fail to comprPhend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of sel(

What do you mean? he said.

This is what I mean, I replied: T will admit that there is a science of science; can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge?

No, just that.

But is knowledge or want of ]rnowl1cdge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?

Certainly not.

The one is medicine, and the other is politics; wht"rcas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure ,md simple.

Very true.

And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of know­ ledge, and ha,;; no furthPr knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows !'-ome­ thing, and has a CPrtain knowledge, whether concerning him­ self or other men.

True.

Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? Say that he knows health;-not wisdom or temperance, but the art of medicine has taught it to him;-and he haslearned harmony from the art of music, and building from the art of building,-neither, from wisdom or temper­ ance: and the same of other things.

That is evident.

How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of know­ ledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?

It is impossible.

Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?

True.

Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the know­ ledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not know?

That is the inference.

Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine