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is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all; andeven if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not <lo us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a henefit and a good. And therefore, 0 son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, an<l also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as l was saying before, the possihility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.

Critias heard me say this, and saw that J was in a diffi­ culty; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so dirl he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answu my challenge or detem1ine the question at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then, Critias, if you like, let us assume that there is this science of science; whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the existence of it, will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self­ knowledge or wisdom: so we were saying?

Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self­ knowing, will know himself.

I <lo not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge: but what neces­ sity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know?