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is that I enquire with you into the truth of that whic.h is ad­ vanced from time to time, just because I do not know; and when I have enquired, I will say whether J agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Reflect, he said.

I am reflecting, T replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of something.

Ycs, he said; the scicnCf• of itsPlf.

Is not medicine, [ said, the science of health? True.

And suppose, I said, that T were asked by you what is the use or effPct of medicine, which is this science of health, T should answer that medicine is of very great use in pro­ ducing health, which, as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Granted.

And if you were to ask me, what is the re<;ult or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does tem­ perance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? Answer me.

That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of any other art? Canyoii show me any such result of them? You cannot.

That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.