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Very good, I said ; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble ?

Yes, certainly, he said.

And the temperate are also good ?

Yes.

And can that be good which does not make men good ?

Certainly not.

And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good ?

That is my opinion.

Well, I said ; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,

"' Modesty is not good for a needy man'?"

Yes, he said; I agree.

Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?

Clearly.

But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good ?

That appears to me to be as you say.

And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good ?

All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true ; but I should like to know what you think about another definition of tem- perance, which I just now remember to have heard from some one, who said, ' That temperance is doing our own business.' Was he right who affirmed that ?

You monster ! I said ; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told you.

Some one else, then, said Critias ; for certainly I have not.

But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this ?

No matter at all, I replied ; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.

There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.

To be sure, I said ; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover their truth or falsehood ; for they are a kind of riddle.

What makes you think so ? he said.