Page:The Development of Navies During the Last Half-Century.djvu/85

 I must, however, now pass on to a change which took place when the present Sir E. Reed was appointed Chief Constructor of the Navy. He was an advocate for iron, shorter ships, complete armour belts, and the concentration of the armament into a smaller number of heavier guns in a central battery or citadel. In 1752 a French naval architect had written: 'Il est certain que ce sont toujours les gros canons qui sont les plus avantageux dans un combat, et ainsi il est préférable de mettre sur un vaisseau un petit nombre de gros canons qu'un grand nombre de petits,' and yet in the old wars we had found number not size most influential in deciding a combat. This was owing to the fact that the issue depended more on the disablement of the crew than of the ship itself. Injury to the masts assisted this result, because it enabled the other ship to attain a position from which the opposing crew could be decimated with impunity. The greater the number of guns (provided their projectiles could penetrate the sides of the enemy's ships) the more chances of disabling men and guns, until submission followed inability to resist. Ships were seldom sunk in action. Such an incident was a matter for regret, because, though diminishing the force of the enemy, it added nothing to your own, whereas a capture counted, to use a parliamentary phrase, two on a division. The prize under another flag was speedily utilised by the conqueror. Of late years sinking appears to be the object aimed at in action, and greater care is taken to avert this than to protect the crew.