Page:The Danger of Mercenary Parliaments - Toland (1698).djvu/11

 they are in a condition to speak and act freely, and discharg'd from those temptations which I find they have not constancy enough to withstand; for after all; I still believe many of them so honest that nothing but Mony or Preferments will corrupt them. But if nothing will satisfy them but the downright subversion of our Constitution; if they will be content with nothing but the utter abolishing of all Laws, and the rooting up of those fences and securities provided by our Ancestors for the preservation of all things that are sacred and esteem'd amongst mankind; it is high time for the Electors to look about them, and disappoint their unreasonable and exorbitant hopes, and to spew them out as detestable Members of the Commonwealth; not only as unfit to be trusted with their Liberties, but as unworthy to breath in the air of a Free Government.

11. If any should say, That the alterations in Elections will stand us in no stead, since whoever are chosen will still be bought off and brib'd by Court-preferments: I answer, it will require a considerable time to new-model and debauch a House of Commons, nor can it be done but by displacing all those who are already possess'd, to make room for these new comers, which will make the trade and mystery of Bribery more plain, and consequently more abhor'd. And since no Parliament can now fit above three years, the Court will meet with fresh Difficulties to interrupt them, which may possibly at last make them weary of these Practices. 'Tis true indeed, this Consideration ought to make us more circumspect in our choice of Members, for tho we should choose but an inconsiderable number of Pensioners, yet will they soon be able to work over a majority to their side: so true is the saying, A little leaven leavens the whole Lump. Whoever therefore out of any particular friendship, or other motives of fear or private Interest, should vote for any one Person so qualify'd; let him consider, that as much as in him lies, he makes a complement of all the Liberties of England to the unsatiable avarice and ambition of Statesmen and Court-Ministers. Since therefore we have so narrowly escap'd our destruction, and one Session more of the last Parliament would infallibly have ruin'd our Constitution, we cannot surely be so grosly overseen as to neglect the opportunity now put into our hands for avoiding the like hazards in time to come; which may easily be done, if the Freeholders and Burghers in England will petition and engage their Representatives to consent to a Bill which shall be brought into the House, to incapacitate all Members for holding Offices and Preferments: or if it should be thought too much to debar them altogether from the enjoyments of Posts of honor and advantage, let them keep them during good behaviour, and not otherwise; that such Places may not be reserv'd in store for those who shall be from time to time elected, and thereby a continued course of corruption be carry'd on successively thro the whole Nation, who will in a few years insensibly find themselves so universally infected with this insinuating Vice, that we shall be throughly ripe for destruction, and readily expose to sale the Liberties of England by Auction to the fairest bidder. If it was deservedly thought one of our most dangerous Grievances, that the Judges, who only declare the Law, should hold their places ad beneplacitum; what condition must we be in when our Law-makers themselves are subjected to the same temptations? Or what advantage have we got by having our Judges Commissions for life, when our very Legislature it self is prostituted to bribery and fordid gain? The fortune of England is now brought to the nicest point, and there are critical seasons, which if neglected, will never again be offer'd; and should we now fail in our duty to our Country, we shall assuredly fall unpitied by the rest of the world. But if on the other hand we can by our foresight and diligence prevent for the future the bribing and corruption of Parliaments, it is not to be imagin'd what security, what happiness, and what immortal reputation will be the neverceasing concomitants of such a Settlement. If the very Rump of a Parliament, even in the midst of domestic Discontents, and beset on all sides with foreign Assaults and vasions