Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol3, 1919.djvu/252

 posed to have hit the village of Keczen, 7 km south of the bridge, and to have killed two boys. The most careful investigation was at once instituted on our side; it was ascertained that there was not the slightest particle of truth in the Magyar charge which was made merely for the purpose of placing the blame on us.

On March 27 Magyars opened a sharp machine gun fire on our sector at Parkany; one soldier was killed, and one soldier and a woman were wounded. On March 29 an attack was made on our troops east of Pinese by a Magyar detachment supported by machine guns. Our troops resisted and drove the Magyars back. On the same night the Magyars fired into Komarno and against our searchlights in Bratislava. A patrol in Keczeny Kovacz, consisting of one officer and six men, was surprised by Magyars and never came back. It would take a long time to recite all the reports of Magyar aggression that used to come daily, nay several times daily, from Slovakia. The Magyars never ceased to make incursions behind the demarcation line, and where they did not come up against our troops, they dragged away all that they laid their hands on, especially cattle; they robbed, plundered and created terror. The most tragical of these crimes was a skirmish on Sunday, April 6, from 2 to 4 in the afternoon at Užhorod; Magyars invaded the city and endangered not only our soldiers, but especially ttje civil population. From that day regular large scale attacks took place.

The most important reason, why we repeatedly asked for changes in the demarcation line, dividing Czechoslovak territory from territory still under Magyar control, consisted in difficulties of communication. The original demarcation line ran along the river Ipol to its confluence with the Danube. Along this river valley runs a railroad, now on the right, now on the left bank. Making the river a boundary line necessarily made it impossible to use the railroad. Even if the entire track ran along the right bank, on our side, we would not have dared to use the line, because Magyar cannon on the hills above the left bank commanded bridges, culverts and rolling stock.

East of Lučenec the demarcation line turns directly east as far as Užhorod, without paying the slightest regard to requirements of traffic or strategy. In a span of 200 km the frontier cuts across four important railroads, leading from north to south. Especially painful for us was the absolute loss of the Michaleny line to Košice (Kaschau) on the one side and to eastern Galicia over the Sanoklen pass on the other.

Thus eastern Slovakia was split from the military and approvisation point of view into two parts, the district of Košice and Užhorod; the second district is especially poor, with population mostly Rusin, and its food supply was so inadequate as to create a condition of actual famine. Repeated urgent requests of civil and military officers induced the ministry of defense to organize very expensive transportation service by trucks and wagons to bring in food and other necessaries. Snow lay long on the mountains, then came the spring floods, so that the work of men assigned to this extemporized military train was extremely arduous.

Conditions changed suddenly after April 30, when the Roumanians began to advance. The nothern wing of General Olteanu moved along the line of Szatmar-Nemiti toward the San, seeking to come into contact with the Czechoslovak troops, while the southern wing of General Metoiu moved on Debrecin and Szolnok. At the same time French divisions pushed forward between Arad and Szegedin, and Serbians moved north between the Tisza and the Danube. Thus the Magyar army located in the Užhorod wedge found itself almost cut off from their main forces. Beginning about April 25 there was not iceable a disorder in the army facing us, there were frequent desertions, and finally falling back or actual flight of the Magyars toward Budapest.

At the end of April 1 had before me many eloquent reports to this effect from army commanders in Slovakia,, [sic]General Piccione, General Hennocque and General Schobl. At the same time it was plain that territory essential to the well-being of Eastern Slovakia was wantonly plundered and spoiled. The territory in question did not fall within the demarcation line, as drawn in January; but as to its final disposition by the peace conference there was no doubt in view of racial, political, economic and military reasons. Czechoslovak armies therefore occupied districts abandoned by the Magyars, and only districts voluntarily abandoned. And I declare solemnly that we have thereby rendered a great service to the local population which will in a short time by the decision of the Paris conference become citizens of our republic; and we have helped the whole country around Košice, Užhorod and the entire home land of the Carpatho-Russians.

Magyar retreat continued to the south beyound Miškovec, toward the west to the bend of the Ipol southeast of Lučenec. To the west of the Balas-Darnoti line Magyars remained in their positions, and the Czechoslovak troops maintained defensive tactics, although they could have taken excellent advantage of the new situation. It would not be just, therefore, to charge the military command or the ministry of defense with interference in the internal affairs of the Magyar Soviet republic. On the other hand I am sure that no member of the National Assembly would out of an excess of scruple remain passive, when after the departure of Magyar army—if bolshevik bands deserve to be called an Army—gangs of robbers plunder districts that will soon be awarded to us.

By May 10 the Roumanians got as far as the Tisza and were obliged to suspend their advance