Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol3, 1919.djvu/115

 has Siberia been brought, because it has found no understanding and no assistance in time. And in this mad chaos far away in the Ural forests the half-frozen Czechoslovak Army side by side with true Russian patriots continues silently to fight and to protect by their blood and lives the chaos in their rear against the vengeance of Bolsheviks. Once enthusiastic dithyrambs of praise and admiration were flying from there into the whole world, now there is only cheap and frivolous criticism and base calumny.

The reasons for this deplorable state of affairs are undoubtedly numerous and may be generally divided into two principal groups: internal and external.

Among the internal reasons for this general decadence I will point out only the chief one, because all the others are derived from it, namely the struggle for control of government among the different political parties. Surely during the whole history of mankind there has not been poured out such a quantity of enthusiastic and patriotic speeches, as in the course of the revolution in Russia. The leaders of political parties speak only in superlatives, and in their speeches the big words of progress, humanity, salvation of the country and regeneration of Russia are continually repeated. Only the silent Czechoslovaks have said nothing, but acted, and therefore most people here cannot understand them yet. The great majority of the Russian people see their only salvation in the constituent assembly and are working for it with great ardor. Others say that the country can be saved without the constituent assembly, believing it to be dangerous and premature for the Russian people who are but little advanced in culture. They favor at this time of unfettered passions the establishment of some form of constitutional government and believe that the nation, worn out by so many privations, will be satisfied with such a government. These people are so afraid of Bolsheviks that they are willing to tolerate any government able to protect their lives and property against the Bolshevik danger, and as regards the future they hope that it will be possible to introduce gradually reforms of a democratic character.

Finally there is a third group of people who cannot forget the old regime and are toiling for the restoration of monarchy by all means at their disposal. Next to the Bolsheviks this is the most contemptible and the most tragic group of Russian people, mastered by thirst for revenge for all the horrors they have endured, or governed by personal ambitions and political views of the epoch of Peter the Great. They are the most efficient allies of the Bolsheviks, even though they stand at the other extreme. With the Bolsheviki they have in common their methods of political struggle: murder, terror, violence. The Russian people fear them so greatly that they are ready to make common cause even with the odious, bloody Bolsheviks against them. This is the saddest page of the Russian revolution; this is the barrier against which all efforts of the best Russian people are constantly breaking down.

To an impartial, unprejudiced observer, thoroughly acquainted with conditions in Russia and with the psychology of the Russian people, to one who does not look upon the regeneration of Russia as temporary repose for a shorter or longer period to be followed again by bloody storms and revolutions, it is clear that a return to the old regime in Russia is impossible and that the only way to better things is through the constituent assembly. The Russian people will accept only such a government as will proceed out of the will of the whole nation, whether the form be constitutional monarchy or republic. All other ways and means could at best establish only a temporary truce, containing in itself germs of renewed bloody tempests. The Russian people will not be satisfied with any other government except the one which they themselves have established.

This diagnosis indicates also the means which must be applied in order to assist effectually the Russian nation.

A year ago the Allies declared that they were willing to help the afflicted Russian people: and they did spend plenty of energy, they have not spared money, they have offered the lives of their citizens, and yet the Russian people have today less confidence in the success of the Allied intervention than they had originally.

Where are we to look for reasons of this failure? The chief cause is of course the passiveness of the intervention, resulting from the principle of non-interference in Russian internal matters; this is interpreted by a great many Russians as support given to reactionary Russian elements, and as a matter of fact these elements do actually