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 *ever may be the result of the impending struggle for naval superiority—which does not altogether depend upon numerical force, but may be greatly influenced by the proficiency of either side in employing the newly-invented implements and modes of warfare—it must be conceded that we cannot expect our superiority will be so absolute as to enable us to trust entirely to our "wooden walls," or to defensive armaments afloat: we must have an ample array of land forces to protect our homes, if menaced by the vast armies of France, which are constantly maintained in a state of full equipment and readiness.

Large armaments maintained during times of peace are repugnant to the feelings and good sense of the English nation; and yet if other nations, less strongly animated by industrial impulses and the principles of political economy, will accumulate immense powers of aggression, we must, in self-defence, maintain efficient means of resisting them. Patriotic feeling and high spirit in the population, even though aided by abundance of arms and ammunition, will not now, as in olden times, suffice. Soldiership is become a scientific profession; and an apprenticeship to the art of war, with skill and experience in every branch of it, are absolutely necessary to oppose with success a well-trained and disciplined force.

Our difficulties in the way of self-preservation are materially increased by the nature of our institutions and our feelings of personal independence. All other great nations in Europe have a power of compulsory enlistment; we have not: if we had, our standing forces for army and navy might be more moderate,—if we only retained efficacious means of rapid organization and equipment. According to our system, however, it is so long before we can procure the necessary number of men for the war establishment, that our only safety must consist in a much greater amount of permanent forces. In short, our purse must pay for our pride.

The volunteer system, however, tends, in some degree, to remedy this disadvantage, and will become more and more valuable in proportion as it shall conform itself gradually to such arrangements as will make our volunteers efficient for acting with our regular forces.

The first and prevalent idea from which the volunteer system sprang was of a levée en masse; that every man animated by British pluck and spirit (and they would number hundreds of thousands) should be well practised in the use of the rifle, and, in case of invasion, should turn out to oppose the enemy, to line the hedges, hang upon the flank and rear of the invading force, and cut it to pieces.

That our volunteers, who have nobly come forward spontaneously, without any prompting from government, would be ready to devote their lives, as they are devoting their time and energies, to the defence of their country against invasion, no one who appreciates the English character will doubt; but that such a heterogeneous body of men, if opposed to a highly-trained and disciplined force of veteran soldiers, would be able to repel the attack of an army, is now generally admitted to be a fallacy; and it would be doing injustice to the intelligence and good sense of Englishmen to blink