Page:The Conception of God (1897).djvu/370

Rh essence of such an objection is the failure to comprehend that self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness are categories which inevitably transcend, while they certainly do not destroy, individuality. The unity of the world is first known to us in terms of knowledge. The world of the Will, as we first see it, is very rightly an individuated world, which appears full of conflict, of mutual independence, and of limitation. By moral Self, we mean, in the ordinary world, the individual as individuated by and through the relation of his will to the contents of his life. The individual is indeed not mere will, nor mere contents of life, but a life viewed in relation to, that is, as individuated by, the exclusive interest which is his characteristic individual will. If such an individual is considered as a knower, this view of the world naturally regards his knowledge as a sort of accident, or instrument, of his will. When such an individual Ego says: “My knowledge, completely developed, pursued to its ultimate consequences, is identical with the Absolute Knowledge,” his fellow-individuals, naturally observing that his will is not theirs, and that his individual life in no wise includes or can include their individual lives, are disposed, if they are unlearned, to make sport, — if they are philosophers, to interpose more