Page:The Conception of God (1897).djvu/307

270 of the world which this variety of individuals implies. The same contents may, for instance, form a part of very various individuals, in so far as the same contents may be the object of various individuating interests, each one of which excludes all other objects, while all refer to the same contents. It is in this sense that even in our ordinary experience different wills can individuate, in different ways, the same object, as many worshippers enjoy the same church, which is an individual in very different senses for all of them.

It follows then, already, that nobody may assume, in advance, any given segmentation of the world, as Professor Howison’s theory does, in order to define a given type of individuation as real. If the Divine Will involves in its unity many ideals, purposes, interests, intents, it may well appear that the world of fact, viewed in the light of these various interests, may prove to be a world of many individuals. But one will not be obliged, in consequence, to break up the unity of the world of knowledge in order to find room for the presence of the various interests that together constitute the organism of the Divine Will. If a certain kind of moral independence amongst these various interests or wills which constitute the Divine Organism is the morally highest conceivable form of life; if, in order that the Divine Will should be the best, it must be differentiated into many forms of will, which do not wholly predetermine the one the other, but which freely unite to constitute the whole: then this variety will exist, precisely because it is the best; but the unity of the world of knowledge, by virtue