Page:The Conception of God (1897).djvu/101

64 established; for whatever one we may hit upon as real, the problem Why this rather than another? must always, as Lord Bacon would say, be left abrupt.

What I venture to suggest, as you will now see, is that the attribute of Goodness demands progress, growth; and that progress, even though past and future coexist, comes into collision with Completeness, because of the inherent arbitrariness of beginning and ending, of germ and fruition. If this position is well taken, either one or the other attribute, either Goodness or Completeness, as Professor Royce conceives Completeness, must be abandoned. I am far from saying that there is no possible way of so conceiving Completeness that it shall be in harmony with Goodness; nor would I even imply that Professor Royce may not have in reserve some mode of proving the existence of a Complete Reality that would avoid a conflict between its Completeness and its Goodness. What I halt at, is simply the mode of proof that he has actually employed, to-night as well as in his book. Upon that, it certainly seems to me that the Completeness established is quite destitute of consistency with Goodness.