Page:The Cession of Louisana to the United States.pdf/1



Dear Sir—You mentioned to me in conversation, a few days since, that the contemplated secession of Louisiana from the Union was looked upon as fraught with a peculiar difficulty, arising from the fact of its having been purchased by the United States, and that this difficulty would probably be forced on the consideration of the State Convention which is to meet at Baton Rouge on the 23d of this month. You further did me the honor to desire the expression of my views to you on the subject. As it is one of general interest, I hope that you will give your sanction to the publicity of this address, which, otherwise, would only have been submitted to your private perusal.

It is, I know, the popular impression that the United States, in consideration of a certain sum of money paid to France for the purchase of Louisiana, acquired that province, with all the rights of unqualified, unconditional and absolute property, in the same way that a cotton or sugar plantation is conveyed by one to the other by a notarial act of sale. But a careful examination of that treaty of cession, with all the circumstances attending it, may somewhat modify that impression.

The United States, being informed of the retrocession of Louisiana to France by Spain, became extremely solicitous to obtain from that power the cession of New Orleans, with a limited adjacent territory, but sufficient to give them egress to the Gulf of Mexico. At first Bonaparte, who was then the ruler of France, showed himself unfavorable to the attempted negotiation on the part of America. However, on the 10th of April, 1803, he said to his Ministers: “I know the full value of Louisiana, and I have been desirous of repairing the fault of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763. A few lines of a treaty restored it to me, and I have hardly recovered it when I must expect to lose it. But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me (meaning England, then the mistress of the seas,) to strip myself of it, than to those to whom I wish to deliver it.” Notwithstanding the stern necessity to which his iron will felt compelled to bend, he still clung to the much-prized acquisition, and still hesitated.

But a few days later, he said to one of the members of his Council: “Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede; it is the whole colony, without reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had for its object its recovery. I renounce it with the greatest regret.” Then he added: “For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring expenses for improvements in Louisiana, for which its trade has never indemnified them. Large sums, which will never be returned to the treasury, have been lent to companies and to agriculturists. The price of all these things is justly due to us. If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits. I will be moderate in consideration of the necessity in which I am of making a sale.” The high personage to whom Bonaparte was addressing these words, and who was to be his negotiator with the American Plenipotentiaries, made some general observations on the cession of the rights of sovereignty, and expressed his doubts as to whether the inhabitants of the territory could be the subject of a contract of sale or exchange. Bonaparte replied impatiently, with his usual abruptness: “You are giving me, in all its perfection, the ideology of the law of nature and of nations. But I require money to make war on the richest nation in the world. Send your maxims to the London market. I am sure that they will be greatly admired there, and yet no great attention is paid to them, when the questions is the occupation of the finest regions of Asia.” Notwithstanding this sarcastic remark, it will be seen that the Minister’s objection, which Bonaparte seemed to treat so slightingly, sank in his mind, and that he subsequently provided for it in the treaty of cession. His sagacious intellect even anticipated another objection. “Perhaps,” he continued, “it will also be objected that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries; but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the Union. The confederations that are called perpetual only last till one of the contracting parties finds it to his interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger to which the colossal power of England exposes us, that I would provide a remedy.” That great man evidently did not understand how a confederation of sovereign States could be maintained beyond the time when it would not be to the interest of any one of the parties to keep up the confederation, and much less when the majority became