Page:The British Controversialist - 1867.djvu/503

14 so far as its kinds differ? In plainer words, what different kinds of knowledge are there? Or it must mean, 2nd, what is knowledge insofar as its various kinds agree? In plainer words, what is the one invariable feature, quality, or constituent common to all our cognitions, however diverse and multifarious dies in other respects maybe. What is the standard factor which never varies while all else varies?"

Epistemology.—(1) Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself. (2) The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, —object plus subject, thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." (3) "The objective part of the object of knowledge, though distinguishable, is not separable in cognition from the subjective part, or the ego; but the objective part and the subjective part do together constitute the unit or minimum of knowledge. (4) Matter per se, the whole material universe by itself, is, of necessity absolutely unknowable. (5) All the qualities of matter by themselves are, of necessity, absolutely unknowable. (6) Every cognition must contain an element common to all cognition, and an element (or elements) peculiar to itself: in other words, every cognition must have a part which is unchangeable, necessary, and universal (the same in all), and a part which is changeable, contingent, and particular (different in all); and there can be no knowledge of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part: exclusive of the changeable, contingent, and particular part; or of the changeable, contingent, and particular part, exclusive of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part: that is to say, neither of these parts by itself can constitute a cognition; but all knowledge is necessarily a synthesis of both factors." (7) "The ego (or mind) is known as the element common to all cognitions; matter is known as the element peculiar to some cognitions: in other words, we know ourselves as the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part of our cognitions, while we know matter, in all its varieties, as a portion of the changeable, contingent and particular part of our cognitions — or, expressed in the technical language of logic, the ego is the known summum genus, the known generic part, of all cognitions; matter is the known differential part of some cognitions." (8) "The ego cannot be known to be material—that is to say, there is a necessary law of reason which prevents it from being apprehended by the senses." (9) "The ego, or self or mind, per se, is, of necessity, absolutely unknowable. By itself—that is, in a purely indeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts—it is no possible object of cognition. It can know itself only in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego—that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself." (10) "Mere objects of sense can never be objects of cognition; in other words, whatever has a place in the intellect (whatever is known) must contain an element which has had no place in the senses; or, otherwise expressed, the senses, by themselves, are not competent to place any knowable or intelligible thing before the mind. They are faculties of nonsense, and can present to the mind only the nonsensical or contradictory." (11) "That alone can be represented in thought which can be presented in knowledge: in other words, it is impossible to think what it is impossible to know; or, more explicitly, it is impossible to think that of which knowledge has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type."