Page:The British Controversialist - 1867.djvu/494

Rh Wilson, and shortly thereafter commenced a literary connection with Blackwood's Magazine, in which a few philosophical articles had been published, 1836-7, by professor Wilson, under the title of "The Metaphysician." These, though characterized by Hamilton as showing "great acuteness," or destined to be eclipsed in brilliancy and acumen by his son in law, when, in 1838-9, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness" appeared holding on its course unflaggingly through seven issues. In these papers Ferrier threw himself boldly forward into a world of new thought, and sought, as Hamilton said "the solution of problems hitherto unattempted in the humbler speculation of this country." This series of papers, we think will yet be regarded as forming the first word of a new era in British speculative science. In acuteness and eloquence few metaphysical disquisitions at all approached them, and none excel them in persistent, close-keeping, unrelaxed sing pursuit of the main idea amidst all the deviousness through which it winds, twists, and turns. Hide and jink as it may, he keeps the object of his search clearly in view, and permits no dodge or difficulty to take his eyes off it. In this initial speculation of his Ferrier insists on "faithfulness and completeness." Push speculation to its uttermost limits, and error is impossible, if we have attended rigidly to the facts which philosophy reveals to us: overlook but a single fact, and our reason, otherwise our faithful minister, is truly a heap of untold treasure, may be converted into a brood of fiends to baffle and destroy us. We can only touch in our analysis one or two of the chief points he enforces, illustrates, and maintains, but these will show how much is to be learned from the perusal of the entire production:—

"That which is called I is a living reality, and though mind, in the psychologist's sense, were annihilated, it would remain a repository of given facts." "I am; what more would I have? what more would I be?" it is the characteristic of man to exist, to be conscious of existence; to be rational, and to know that he is so. That "marks man off from other things with a line of distinct and deep-drawn demarcation." "There are three problems vital to the science of ourselves; these are—first, when does consciousness come into operation? Second, how does consciousness come into operation? And 3rd, what are the consequences of coming into operation?" "Consciousness develops and preserves itself by refusing to take part or to identify itself with the sensation, passion, or whatever it may be that is striving to enslave the man; and the ego (I)—which is but the person and vital expression of consciousness—exists merely by refusing to imbibe the impressions of external things. Thus so far is it from being true, that outward objects take effect upon me, that I, in truth only am by resisting and refusing to be impressed by their action." "Consciousness is action, and is opposed to sensation because it is not derivative." "The word I is evolved out of the active consciousness; the act of consciousness is evolved out of an active antagonism, put forth against all the derivative modifications of our being; this act of antagonism is evolved out of freedom, and freedom is evolved out of will; and thus we make will the lowest foundation stone of humanity."