Page:The Bohemian Review, vol2, 1918.djvu/180



In the morning of June 15th our attack was launched on a long front exetndingextending [sic] fro mthefrom the [sic] Tirol mountains to the Adriatic; it had behind it a storming power such as could be produced only by forces worked out to the least detail and by complete co-operation of all the branches of the service. But at the very beginning of the fighting it became evident that the enemy was exceedingly well prepared to resist and counter-attack at the very places that were selected for the penetration of his lines. It was also ascertained that our adversaries were minutely informed about the extent, the day and the hour of our attack. Thus the moment of surprise, so important to the success of an offensive, failed us. Shortly after, the fact became established by documents that a number of deserters furnished the Italian High Command with material which, upon checking up and comparison, enabled the enemy leaders to form a fairly exact conception of our dispositions for attack.

Officers and men of numerous English, French and Italian regiments taken prisoners stated unanimously that their units were advised on the evening of June 14th that the Austro-Hungarian offensive would start at 2 o’clock on the following morning. They understood that Jugo-Slav deserters told the exact time of attack. The enemy took steps against the expected gas bombardment, which naturally failed to have any results.

To pick out several illustrations: the Bersaglieri battalion 3-20 received orders on June 14th to increase the supply of cartridges for each man from 72 to 240. The Pinerolo brigade stood ready for fighting at 2 o’clock in the morning. In a captured order issued in the evening of June 14th, it states: “According to careful advices it appears that the enemy will begin a cannonading preparatory to an attack in the early hours of June 15th. Gas sentries must double their vigilance. At midnight hot coffee and preserved meat will be served out. An alarm will be sounded on June 15th at 1 o’clock; the soldier saresoldirs are [sic] to be on watch with weapons in their hands and ready to put on their gas masks.”

It is natural that the Italian High Command did not make public the names of the deserters to whom it was due that the Italian defeat was not turned into a collapse of its entire armed strength. Nevertheless, a systematic study of numerous captured documents has thrown much light on this subject. The names of some of the deserters are now known, and it has been ascertained what information has been furnished by these traitors to the Italians. For some time the Italian High Command has been engaged in spreading disaffection in our lines. In Italian prison camps Slav soldiers were—against all international law—urged to join the Czechoslovak Legion. Their total ignorance of the real war situation as a whole is due to the clever Italian censoring of news from their home, and it was used with results by certain conscienceless propagandists. At order of the Third Italian Army Command, No. 1658 Prot. H. I. dated May 14th, 1918, speaks of an active propaganda by means of Czech volunteers to invite deserters from the Austro-Hungarian armies to the Italian side. The willing tools of high treason whose feverish imagination makes then completelylcompletely [sic] blind to the real needs of their country are deceived by official Italian claims that riots and rebellions follow each other in Bohemia. In the above mentioned order it is claimed that some attempts at the corruption of Czech elements have been successful. No doubt a number of Czech soldiers went over to the Italians, others remained in order to go over when they should have important news to bring. Even though the contemptible means which Italy is using to seduce our men into high treason and perjury shattered themselves on the heroic opposition of our troops without regard to nationality, threethere [sic] have yet been individual persons who allowed themselves to be used by the enemy for spying services. Two specially flagrant cases may be mentioned here:

Private Rudolph Paprakar of the Machine Gun Detachment, according to a report of the commander of his regiment, dated June 8 1918, jumped into the Piave near the villa Jacur and swam across the stream at the risk of his life. He gave away the location, strength and composition of his command and on the basis of his careful observation and spying he communicated highly important advices from which the Italians could ascertain our plans of attack against Montello. He further communicated to the enemy full details of our preparations for the crossing of the Piave, as well as carefully collected information about the movement of troops, position of batteries, etc.

The Italian command ascribes the greatest part of this treason to Lieut. Karl Stiny of one of the infantry regiments, who deserted in the neighborhood of Norenta. From a voluminous document in which the information brought by him is summed up it appears that he gave away completely our preparations on the Piave and also brought to the enemy a number of very valuable reports. An official Italian estimate of Stiny reads thus: “The lieutenant is a highly intelligent Czech, with glowing national feelings and strong anti-Austrian sentiments. His statements bear the character of complete reliability. He purposely gathered all possible