Page:The Art of War in the Middle Ages (Chadwick, 1885, artofwarinmiddle00omanuoft).pdf/19

-A.D. 582.] marked as in earlier ages, and it therefore required to be more strongly supported by cavalry than had been previously necessary. The Franks, Burgundians, and Allemanni of the days of Constantince were no longer the half-armed savages of the first century, who, 'without helm or mail, with weak shields of wickerwork, and armed only with the javelin ,' tried to face the embattled front of the cohort. They had now the iron-bound buckler, the pike, and the short stabbing sword (), as well as the long cutting sword (), and the deadly '' or battle-axe, which, whether thrown or wielded, would penetrate Roman armour and split the Roman shield. As weapons for hand to hand combat these so far surpassed the old ',' that the imperial infantry found it no light matter to defeat the German tribe. At the same time, the morale of the Roman army was no longer what it had once been: the corps were no longer homogenous, and the insufficient supply of recruits was eked out by enlisting slaves and barbarians in the legions themselves, and not only among the auxiliary cohorts. Though seldom wanting in courage, the troops of the fourth century had lost the self-reliance and cohesion of the old Roman infantry, and required far more careful handling on the part of the general. Few facts show this more forcibly than the proposal of the tactician Urbicius to furnish legionaries with a large supply of portable beams and stakes, to be carried by pack-mules attached to each cohort. These were to be planted on the flanks and in the front of the legion, when there was a probability of its being attacked by hostile cavalry: behind them the Romans were to await the enemy's onset, without any attempt to assume the offensive. This proposition marks a great decay in the efficiency of the imperial