Page:The Annual Register 1899.djvu/44

 36] ENGLISH HISTOKY. [feb.

left off, British territory must begin. It was inevitable that we should enter into the competition for African trade, and we were bound to prevent the danger of exclusion. If we had gone too fast, the pace had been forced by other nations, but we had acted in conformity with the responsibilities of empire.

His speech was in strong contrast with that of his leader, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, who seemed unable to make up his mind upon which side of the fence to get down ; and, like Mr. Morley, seemed when in office to have concurred in a policy which when in Opposition he found it easy to condemn. He had always viewed with suspicion, he said, this policy of advance up the Nile. It was necessary that the influence of Egypt should be supreme in the Nile Valley ; therefore, while he was opposed to the policy of advance, he did not regard it with the strong antipathy which was shown to it in some quarters. His chief objection to the occupation of the Soudan was that it appeared to involve limitless possibilities. If the amendment could undo what had been done he could not support it ; but regarding it as a protest against the continued policy of advance, he had no hesitation in voting for it.

The effect of these trimming tactics was promptly shown by the division which followed, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman finding only 58 members to support him out of 185 English and Scotch Liberals, whilst 167 members of all shades voted against the amendment he had endorsed. The healing of the breach in the Liberal party consequently seemed as far off as ever.

On the following evening (Feb. 25) Sir Edward Grey was able to speak more clearly with regard to the party differences over the Egyptian question. As the guest of the Eighty and Bussell CluDS at Oxford, in replying to the toast of the Liberal party, he declared firmly that the evacuation policy, advocated by a small section, was distinctly impossible. On the other hand, the question whether the Soudan expedition could have been avoided was more difficult to answer. He and others of his party not only held that it was bound to come, but that things would have been worse without it. On the other hand the whole Liberal party was united against any further expan- sion in Africa. The sole question which remained was : Were they prepared to accept the obligations they had already in- curred ? " If they accepted the result of the expedition, then the differences of opinion in the party would become less and less till they disappeared altogether."

The threatened misunderstanding with France, arising out of the Fashoda incident, had been scarcely explained and adjusted when news was received of a fresh source of dispute. It transpired that France for some unexplained reason had recently demanded a coaling station on the south coast of Arabia. The Sultan of Oman, as the suzerain, granted a port at Muscat capable of being fortified and of receiving a fleet, but a place under British protection by treaty. On this being known at