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 scribes to us a conduct very different from that of every other nation. Our natural strength is a maritime strength, as trade is our natural employment: these must always go hand in hand, and they mutually support each other. But, if turning our back to our real interests, and abandoning our natural element, we enter that inextricable labyrinth of continental politics; if we make ourselves parties in every controversy; if we exhaust our wealth in purchasing the useless and precarious friendship of every petty prince or state; if we waste the blood of our people in all the quarrels that may arise on the continent; so far from going in the right way to reduce France, that we attack her on the strong fide, and only destroy ourselves by our ill judged efforts against the enemy. That we can have nothing to fear from the superiority of France on the continent, whilst we preserve our superiority at sea; that we can always cut the sinews of the enemies strength by destroying their traffic; that to fear an invasion from a power weak in its marine, is the idlest of all fears; that in case an invasion were possible, a well-trained national militia, supplying by their zeal the defects of their discipline, would prove our best protection; that a standing army is in whatever shape dangerous to freedom; and that a government like ours, connected by its very essence with the liberty of the subject, can never be in want of the supports of despotic power. As little is parliamentary influence necessary. A government pleasing to the people, as every good government must be, can never be generally opposed: and men need no bribes to persuade them to their duty.

These notions, so opposite in their extremes, might be reconciled in a medium, and used to temper each other. For as on one hand, it would be very absurd to take no sort of advantage of our insular situation, but to engage in all the business of the continent without reserve, and to plunge ourselves into real evils out of dread of possible mischiefs; so on the other hand to think ourselves wholly unconcerned in the fortunes of our neighbours on the continent, or to think of aiding them in any case, only by the way of diversion with our fleets, would be a way of proceeding still more extravagant than the former. If such notions were reduced to practice, we might soon lose all these advantages derived from a situation which we abused.

The reasonableness of such a temperament, could not be perceived during the ferment of that time, in which these topics were bandied to and fro with infinite heat. The resignation or rather deprivation of the popular ministry, only increased their popularity, and the general discontent; the people could not believe that good measures could be pursued, when those in whom alone they confided, were not employed; almost all the corporations of the kingdom presented the deprived ministers with their freedom, and addressed them in the warmest manner, testifying the most entire approbation of their conduct, and the sincerest concern to see them out of employment.

This conflict between an old established interest, and the torrent of popularity continued for a long time, and the nation was almost ruined by it. It is not easy nor perhaps quite proper to attempt to trace the steps by which so happy a coalition, as we have seen take place, was brought about. But it was formed in