Page:The Annual Register 1758.djvu/174

 i6o ANNUAL REGISTER, 1758.

greater diftance, either from the RufTians or the Swedes, or even from Lufatia or SileHa ; he there, fore fuddenly took a refolution to draw near to the combined army, and to direft his march towards Stolpen ; and this the rather, as the city of Drefden could not be attacked in form, and as the news of an entire defeat (is it was falfely called) of the Rullian army, was received at the fame time. It was therefore very natural to imagine, that the King of Pruflia would hailen back with a confulerable army, and render the fiege of Dref- den of no effefl.

As foon as the imperial and royal army had fixed its camp at Stolpen, the field marlhal employ- ed himfelf in reconnoitring the po- fition of the enemy, and in forming new plans to give him an effeflual blow. On the 9th he held a con- ference with the Prince of Deux- Ponts, at which he propofed a de- lign a little too bold perhaps ; namely, that this prince fliould attack the enemy next day ; that for this end he (the marfhal) would approach that very night to the fllbe, pafs it between the enemy's camp and Drefden, laying bridges between two fires at afmall dillance from each other; and carryover his whole army ; attack the enemy, and cut him oit from Drefden. The PrinceofDeux-Ponts entered whol- ly into this plan ; only he found it impofTible to make the attack next day, becaufe the time was too fliort to make the nccefiary difpofitions, call in the det;iched poHs, and em- ploy them where neceflary.

'I'hough the marflial infifted with the more vehemence on ti e necef- fity of making hafte, as we had re- ceived fure account?, that the king was on his march with a confider-

able body, and there was no: a mo- ment to lo(e, he faw himfelf forced, however, by thccbrtacjesjuft men- tioned, to defer the attack till the nth. It was agreed therefore, that in the night between the loth and nth, the imperial and royal army (hould approach to the Elbe, and lay bridges over it ; that thp combined army Ihould advance in order of battle, and make thofe movements on the flanks which fhould be deemed proper; and that at day break it fhould venture to make the attack. This plan of operations was executed, excepting the attack ; for Marfh;il Daun re- ceived the fame day, the loth, certain intelligence that the king was arrived near Drefden with a confiderable body, and that the reft of the enemy's troops were not far off. On this account, it was, after mature deliberation, judged to be an enterprife too rafli to at- tempt to pafs fuch a river as the Elbe, between the army of Prince Henry, and the city of Drefden, and that at a time when there was another army behind them ; that in cafe of any misfortune the impe- rial and royal army would be expofed to total ruin. The mar- fhal, agreeably to his ufual fore- fight and experience in war, came over to this opinion, and faw him- felf obliged to fignify to the Prince of Deux-Ponts, even the very night in which the attack was to have been made, that difiiculties had occurred in relation to the attack which had been concerted, and even in feme meafure begun.

Thus one principal proje*^, namely., the fpeedy expolfion of Prince Henry, failed. We could not, however, have hindered him from joining the kinga little further down the river, and frcm oppoilng

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