Page:The American review - a Whig journal of politics, literature, art, and science (1845).djvu/128

114 prolong or exasperate them. It has rather for its objects to set forth some of the features in the contest which should not be overlooked—to explore some of the causes of the result which may furnish lessons of wisdom or of courage—to estimate carefully the real Aveight of the decision against us, and to cast, as sagaciously as may be, the horoscope of our future fortunes.

The great political contests, hitherto, for tlie possession and control of the general government, by whatever names significant of their principles the parties therein may have been designated, have been, in fact and in profession, carried on between the Administration and Opposition; and from these relations the combatants have drawn much towards their organization and their strength. It was a remarkable feature in the late election, that from a most peculiar concurrence in political events, and an equally peculiar combination of political influences, this element was so modified in its operation, as to produce most singular and, to the Whig party, most disastrous results. The existing administration, elected by the Whigs, had been controlled by their principles and had carried out their measures only to a very limited extent, and for a very brief period. Long before the marshalling of the array for the decisive struggle, it had alienated itself from our principles and been driven with scorn from our confidence; and, after a feeble experiment upon its capacity of standing alone, it had finally transferred its favor and its patronage, its means for, and its material of, corruption, its whole disposable mercenary force, into the hands of our opponents.

The history of previous national elections shows, that the active force of the party in power, necessarily incident to its position, combined with the natural vis inertiæ, when the eople have been at all closely divided in political opinions, has not only served as an important makeweight in the scale, but has generally proved decisive in turning it. The same history also teaches that when the party in power, in despite of the advantages of its position, has been in fact supplanted by its rival, it has been overborne as much by its own misdeeds and the accession of negative strength, which they gave to the opposition, as by the proper vigor derived by the latter from its own positive principles. Besides, the opposition has always relied much upon the lust of change, ever an effective element in all popular movements—much more upon the selfish arguments which the prospect of new political arrangements always offers to the large and apparently increasing body of voters who make politics a trade. These influences compensate somewhat for the capital of the actual possession of power, in which the administration, of course, have the advantage. The "Outs" have a vast speculative capital, upon which they can issue abundant promises, to be redeemed when success shall have furnished the means. The "Ins" have exhausted their resources in the satisfaction of past services; they can alarm with the fear of losing, but can afford no stimulus to the hope of gain.

The application of these remarks to the position of the two great parties, relatively to Mr. Tyler's administration, will exhibit the remarkable influence which the latter, so utterly feeble and insignificant in every moral point of view, was enabled to exert and did exert, under the novel circumstances of the case. Neither the Whigs nor the Democrats could properly be called the Administration party; neither, the Opposition. But mark how unequally the qualities of these antagonist positions, so important for the battle which we were approaching as to have often alone decided the field, were divided between the two parties. The Democrats had all the power of administration, all the prestige of opposition; the Whigs, all the burdens of administration—all the obstacles of opposition. If John Tyler could have thrust upon our opponents all the imbecilities, all the ineffable perfidies and scarce imaginable meannesses which compose the history of his dynasty, by the same transfer which conveyed to them the whole resources of government influence and patronage, we should have been for once his debtors. No strength which he could have imparted with all his accidental power, would have sufficed to bear up the load of inbred and accumulated sins which would thus have devolved upon his luckless legatees. His political testament did not so equitably provide; he left to us all his monstrous debts, to others all the substantial value which he had to bequeath. Of his ragged army, the impedimenta, the vile baggage, fell to our share — the armory and military chest were betrayed to our enemies. This position of things was entirely unparalleled