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 668 SCHELLING (1801), in relation to nature a fragment of his project; and in a more popular way, in his Vorlesungen fiber die Methode des akade- mischeji Studiums (1803). In this doctrine of absolute identity we have the most enigmati- cal and obscure, not to say paradoxical stage of his philosophy, which at that time, as He- gel said, "he made before the public," not yet waiting, as Kant always did, for his ripened statements. If taken as his whole and final system, it is a pantheistic mysticism ; but Schelling, in his later account of it, says that it represents only the negative, abstract side of his philosophy, to be supplemented by its positive and historical portions. This system of absolute identity is constructed in the geo- metric method, following the example of Spi- noza ; and the ideal and real poles are in fact parallel with the two "modes" of thought and extension in the ethics of Spinoza. It is around this point that the subsequent specula- tions of Schelling revolve, though for many years he struggled in the vain attempt to rec- oncile the pantheistic tendencies of these ear- lier essays with the theistic and Christian po- sitions which he gradually adopted and de- fended. In this transition period he was called from Jena to Wurzburg (1803), where he taught for two years, in fellowship and some- times in rivalry with Paulus and J. J. Wagner. In 1808 he became secretary of the academy of the arts of design in Munich ; in 1820 he with- drew to Erlangen to write his Philosophic der Mythologie and Philosophie der Offenbarung, which form vols. ii., iii., and iv. of his col- lected works published after his death by his sons. In 1826, when the university of Lands- hut was removed to Munich, he accepted a chair, and attracted enthusiastic auditors from all parts of Germany, from France, England, and Greece. Several works which he had in the mean while published indicate the struggles and developments of his system. In his Eru- no, oder uber da gdttliche und natarliche Prin- cip der Dinge (1802), he discoursed, in the man- ner of the Platonic dialogue, upon the unity of the infinite and finite, the possible and the real, as these must be found in the eternal being ; expressly denying that the knowledge of the absolute can be attained in "a merely logical way." His work Philosophie und Re- ligion (1804) develops the idea of divine free- dom in relation to creation. Still maintaining (what he subsequently denied in his essay on " Freedom ") that the finite as such implies the fall, he here denies that there can be any ema- nation of the world from God, and says that the transition can only be made by a leap, by an act, and an act of free will, in his Dar- legung des wahren Verh&Uinsses der Natur- philosophie zur verbesserten Fithte'schen Lehre (1806), the theosophic element becomes more prominent ; the Christian mystics and Boehm affect his theories and statements.* lie was feeling his way to the position decisively ta- ken in the introduction to the first volume of his collected works (Philosophische Schriften, 1809), and in the Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, which forms the concluding treatise of that volume. In the preface he says the real antagonism of philoso- phy is found in the two ideas of necessity and freedom. The question of sin and its origin is the capital and decisive inquiry. God is viewed as a person and a will. There still remains a " dark ground " in deity, by which to explain creation and sin, but the personal deity (he alleges in his later expositions) is the prius and lord of this " nature in God." Free- dom in the creature is essentially the possi- bility of good and evil. Out of the nexus of cause and effect, beyond even the sphere of consciousness, each individual determines his nature by an act which, though "out of all time," is still recognized as free by the sense of responsibility and guilt. In his Denkmal against Jacobi (1812) he denies that there can be two kinds of philosophy, and insists on the necessity of a scientific theism, which should recognize God as the absolute personality, and yet find in him the basis of all real existence. A " Reply to Eschenmayer " (in the Allge- meine Zeitschrift) refutes the objection that he, like Boehm, puts " Satan in God." Ueber die Gottheiten von Samothrake (1816) is a classical fragment of his mythology, somewhat arbitrary in its hypotheses. Sixteen sheets of his Vorlesungen uber di Philosophie der Mythologie were printed in 1830, but with- drawn from circulation. Nearly 20 years had now passed since he had published any marked work. Meanwhile Hegel had elaborated his system, with a more logical and constructive talent; introducing a principle of movement, which was not a personal will, into the abso- lute being, and identifying the logical process of the idea with the development of real being. Cousin wrote a slight sketch of German phi- losophy ; Beckers put it into German ; and Schelling broke his long silence by writing a preface, in which he accused Hegel of con- structing his whole scheme upon a misunder- standing of the true sense and import of the system of identity. About ten years after Hegel's decease his instructor became his suc- cessor at the university of Berlin (1841). The capital of Prussia greeted him with open arms. Frederick William IV., Neander, and Miiller hailed him with encouragement. He was laud- ed as the spiritus rector of the century, who through philosophy was to lead philosophy back to Christ. The Hegelians accused him of recreancy to the " idea," of theosophy, of mys- ticism. His lectures were published, without his consent, by both Frauenstadt and Paulus. But he lectured only a few semesters, and then withdrew from public life to perfect the de- tails of his system. His physical constitution was vigorous, and his mental clearness was un- impaired to the last. Two of his sons, Karl Friedrich August and Hermann, have pub- lished an edition of his collected works (14