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 PHILOSOPHY beautiful and for artistic production. French philosophy, during the closing part of the last century, was completely under the influence of the school of Condillac. Metaphysics was re- garded as nothing hut the analysis of sensa- tions. As these might he considered with ref- erence either to the organs of sensation or to the mind, the school was divided into two branches, one represented by Cabanis, so thor- ough a materialist that he pronounced thought a secretion of the brain, and the other by De- stutt de Tracy, who sought to derive from the experience of volition notions not given in sen- sation. A reaction followed, in part theologi- cal, represented by Bonald, Lamennais, and De Maistre, and in part psychological, represented by Maine de Biran and Royer-Collard. Lamen- nais followed Pascal in emphasizing the illu- sions of sense and the weakness of reason, to find in universal consent a better basis for re- ligious certitude ; while De Maistre, the founder of modern ultramontanism, framed a philos- ophy of history in harmony with his creed. Maine de Biran objected to the sensationalists, that they formed their notions of internal after the analogy of external causes. Koyer-Oollard introduced into France the Scotch philosophy, especially insisting upon Reid's distinctions and principles. His most distinguished disciple was Victor Cousin (1792-1867), who originated the eclectic school, designed to occupy a middle place between the German and the Scotch philosophy. For a time attracted strongly by German idealism, and approximating to pan- theistic views, his later course, especially after his historical studies, was more in the line of the Scotch philosophy. In close sympathy with him, as the most celebrated of his disci- ples, was Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), really his superior in a spirit of method and precision, who from his psychological standpoint, which he never deserted, extended his speculations into sssthetics and moral philosophy. The pe- culiar circumstances of French social life mean- while drew large attention to questions of so- cial philosophy, in connection with which the elements of human nature, including the pas- sions and affections, were studied, and the re- lations of individualism to social order were investigated. In this sphere Saint-Simon, Fou- rier, Leroux, and some writers on questions of political economy, have won distinction. Auguste Oomte (1798-1857) is known as the founder of the positivist school, the funda- mental doctrine of which is the denial of all metaphysics, and the limitation of positive knowledge by the exclusion of all assertion of first or final causes. Allied to this is the posi- tion of the three states, theological, metaphys- ical, and positive, through which the individ- ual mind and the human race alike must pass in their progressive development. Of recent French writers on different branches of philos- ophy may be mentioned Bouillier, the historian of Cartesianism ; Paul Janet, a critic of Buch- ner's materialism ; Jules Simon ; Damiron ; T. H. Martin ; E. Vacherot, author of numerous philosophical works, among them a "Diction- ary of Philosophical Sciences ; " and E. Saisset, whose edition of Spinoza has taken its place as a classic in philosophical literature. In Italy the name of Vico (1668-1744) is the most illus- trious among the philosophical thinkers of the 18th century. His Scienza nuova produced a deep impression beyond the bounds of his own country. In the comprehensiveness of his sur- vey of the philosophy of history, he embraced all science and all elements of human progress. He has been pronounced " the founder of the philosophy of history, and of the psychology of races or nations." In more recent times philosophical development has been influenced mainly by two diverse tendencies, that of Des- cartes and Malebranche (idealism) on one side, and that of Locke and Condillac (sensational- ism) on the other. With the revival of na- tional aspirations, a native and more indepen- dent philosophy sprang up. The representa- tive of empiricism was Melchiorre Gioja (1767- 1829), a follower of Condillac in psychology, of Bacon in method, and of Bentham in morals. He was followed by Romagnosi, who however rejected the notion that ideas are but trans- formed sensations, and held that the harmony between the faculties of the mind and the forces of nature is the foundation of all philosophy. He opposed Rousseau's views of civil society, and maintained that right is subordinate to duty. Galuppi (1770-1846) sought to establish the validity of knowledge by the analysis of thought, directing his attention mainly to psy- chology, which, with ideology, he made to em- brace all metaphysical science. Dividing phi- losophy into subjective and objective, he in- clined to Kant rather than to Locke, and his views of duty and of theism were Kantian. Rosmini (1797-1855) was the founder of mod- ern idealism in Italy. He rejects all the gener- ally accepted solutions of the problem of knowl- edge, in part admitting Kant's views, but ex- cepting to his extreme of subjective perception. He holds the primitive and necessary intuition to be the idea of possible being. To matter he concedes a primitive sensibility, holding with Campanella that chemical atoms are endowed with a principle of life, and with Bruno that a universal soul exists in nature, whose sphere is indefinite space. Creation is the result of that divine love which is the necessity of absolute being. It is God in its ideal essence, but not in its realization, which is finite. Mamiani (born in 1799) is an ontologist, holding imme- diate perception as the only foundation of the knowledge of reality. But combined with per- ception in the unity of mental action is intel- lection, which consists in the relation of the mind to ideas, which are intellectual symbols of the absolute reality, and in the divine mind are real objects. The existence of God is thus founded on the very nature of primitive intui- tion, and its demonstration a priori is a sim- ple process of induction from the principle of