Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume X.djvu/722

 716 LUNACY be disproved. Thus, in the case of a deed, the burden of proving a grantor's insanity rests ordinarily on him who impeaches the instru- ment for this cause. Yet, on the other hand, proof of general and usual insanity may be rebutted by evidence that the act was done du- ring a lucid interval, and the burden of prov- ing this rests on the party who asserts the ex- ception. Moral insanity alone, that is, mere derangement of the moral faculties, does not invalidate a will. The evidence must show a delusion in matters of fact. A higher degree of insanity must be shown, in order to absolve from criminal guilt, than to discharge from civil obligation. In some cases it has been held that the jury must be instructed that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a suf- ficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commission of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing ; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. These were the rules laid down by the judges in McNaughten's case before the house of lords. In Rogers's case in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Shaw instructed the jury that in case of partial insanity the party must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the re- lation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him ; and to know that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dic- tates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of duty. But, on the contrary, if he still understands the nature of his act and its consequences, if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, the partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts. If it be found that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be whether the disease existed to so high a de- gree that for the time being it overwhelmed all reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the person in committing the crime acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it. Where this view of insanity pre- vails, such a defence must be substantially proved as an independent fact, and the burden of proof is of course on the defendant. But in other cases it has been declared that the burden is on the prosecution to establish be- yond a reasonable doubt all the conditions of guilt, including criminal capacity. Evidence of acts, declarations, and conduct, both before and after the time when the alleged crime was committed, is admissible as tending to show insanity at the moment of the act. Evidence of hereditary insanity is also admissible, both in civil and criminal cases. Whatever be the nature or degree of mental disease, if the mind be so much impaired as to be incapable of in- telligent disposal in the ordinary affairs of life, it is in civil jurisprudence irresponsible for its acts. He whose mind is so far overshadowed possesses no longer a disposing and consenting will. He is therefore incapable of making contracts, for a contract requires a concurrence of wills. When one of the parties to a con- tract of marriage lacks the capacity of consent, there is no mutually binding promise, and the marriage is void. Whether, in a given case, such a disability existed as to render the con- tract impossible, is generally declared and the nullity of the marriage pronounced by com- petent judicial authority. But though the con- tracts of an insane man are necessarily void, he has not always been permitted to repudiate them. Until the time of Edward III. no ob- jection seems to have been made to such a pro- ceeding. Afterward the absurd maxim grew into a rule, recognized by the most eminent legal authorities, that no man should be permitted to stultify himself. The strictness of the rule was gradually relaxed; not at first on the ground that lunacy was a defence in itself, but that it was competent evidence to show that undue advantage had been taken of a party, or that actual fraud had been practised upon him, by reason of his imbecility. This rule is now abandoned, and if one enters into a con- tract while he is deprived of reason he may avoid it when he recovers his sanity. Yet the exception is admitted that one may not plead his lunacy to annul his contract for necessaries made with him in good faith by the other par- ty; nor if, in fact, no advantage were taken of the lunatic, can a purchase made in good faith be rescinded, if injustice would thus be wrought to the other party, and both cannot be placed in statu quo. A testament discloses the will of the testator ; but when a disposing will fails, a testament is impossible, and the writing which purports to be one is a nullity. It is- naturally very difficult to prove the exis- tence of a lucid interval; far more difficult than to prove the existence of general insanity. It is sufficient for the purposes of the law that the mind appears to have been rational when the will was made. Indeed, the will itself may furnish strong, perhaps the best evidence of the lucid interval. If testimony can be ad- duced to show that the act was done without any assistance, and the writing itself discloses no marks of delusion or folly, no further proof can generally at least be required. It has been already stated that the same degree of incapa- city which invalidates civil acts, does not ex- empt from criminal responsibility. When in- sanity is pleaded to a charge of crime, the real question which the law entertains is: Was there a criminal intent? was the accused capa-