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756 manifested itself in Germany. The Prussian government, though willing to defend Austria's German provinces, and even the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, under certain restrictions, would not stir unless it should obtain the military leadership of all Germany, irrespective of all limitations contained in the act of confederation. After long and angry discussions the leadership was conceded to Prussia by the smaller states. A circular despatch of the Russian government, covertly threatening Germany if it should interfere in the Italian war, had no effect but the assumption by Prussia of a more defiant attitude toward France, and the issue of an order by the prince regent to mobilize two thirds of the Prussian army (June, 1859). A few days later, the Prussian delegate in the diet moved that two federal army corps under the command of Bavaria be stationed on the upper Rhine, and one Prussian corps on the Main, and that the 9th and 10th federal army corps be united with the Prussian army. This motion was followed by another, to the effect that the diet should appoint a commander-in-chief of the non-Prussian and non-Austrian army corps. Thus the German confederation appeared to be on the very point of waging war against France, under Prussian leadership, when all at once Austria, unwilling to sacrifice its preponderating influence in Germany to the doubtful project of preserving its Italian provinces, introduced in the diet a resolution to mobilize the whole federal army, and to appoint the Prussian prince regent commander-in-chief, subject to the control of the diet, or rather of Austria, the latter being always certain of a majority in the diet. This movement at once neutralized all advantages Prussia had obtained. And when the preliminaries of peace were agreed upon by the emperors of France and Austria at Villafranca, July 11, the dissension and jealousy between Austria and Prussia, those great impediments to German unity, were more apparent than ever before. A passage in the Austrian emperor's proclamation of peace, in which he asserted that his natural allies had forsaken him, and that the neutral powers would have imposed upon him less favorable terms of peace than were offered by his adversary, gave rise to an acrimonious correspondence between the Austrian and Prussian governments. The latter succeeded in proving that the assertion of the emperor had no foundation in fact, and that he had been purposely misled by false representations of the French ruler at the interview of Villafranca. This singular discovery did not render the feeling of Austria any more friendly toward Prussia. A paper war was carried on by the presses of southern and northern Germany, and while the governments of those petty states who had been the most forward in their hostile demonstrations against France were eagerly courting the favor of Napoleon III., the most sinister threats against Prussia came from Vienna, Munich, and

Carlsruhe. The opinion became prevalent that, Austria having been humbled by France, if a war for the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine should be waged by France against Prussia, the latter would not obtain any assistance either from Austria or the smaller German states. The hostility of the two great sections of Germany manifested itself in sanguinary riots in the mixed Prussian and Austrian garrison of the federal capital (Aug. 6-8). Feeble movements were initiated by the liberal party to arrest the progress of disunion, and to prompt the Prussian government to take the lead in reforming the federal constitution. But Prussia, disheartened and unwilling openly to oppose the influence of Austria, declined the destiny which the liberal party pressed upon it, and would promise nothing more than the promotion of liberal institutions by the power of its example. Austria, on the other hand, made some show of concessions to the popular wishes, in order to divide the current of the sympathies of the popular party in Germany. A committee was appointed by the emperor (August) to draw up a constitution on the basis of provincial representation for the Austrian empire. At the same time another movement was initiated in Bavaria, the object of which was the creation of a separate confederation of the central German states, as a third great power within Germany. The same idea had been promoted by Bavaria in 1850, and then led to confusion and disunion. Notwithstanding the discouraging conduct of the Prussian government, the liberal party of Germany on Sept. 16 established a national association, the Nationalverein, to agitate and promote in all the particular states the conversion of the confederation (Staatenbund) into one compact federal state with a national representation (Bundesstaat), under the headship of Prussia. Prussia in no way expressed approval of this project, but it soon took occasion to oppose in the federal diet the policy of Austria and its allies. It moved on Oct. 10 that the liberal constitution of Hesse-Cassel of 1831, which in 1852 had been abolished by the elector in an illegal way, be restored. The legislature of Hesse-Cassel fully approved of this proposition, but in the federal diet the Austrian influence led to its rejection. In May, 1860, the motion of Prussia for a reform of the military constitution of the German confederation was likewise rejected. The dissatisfaction which this attitude of Austria caused among the liberals of the central and southern states was somewhat mitigated by the publication of the new fundamental law in Austria, on Oct. 20, 1860, which appeared as a concession to constitutional principles. Prussia, on the other hand, greatly offended the liberals by the, ultra-conservative principles professed by King William I., who on Jan. 2, 1861, succeeded his brother Frederick William IV. In December the Saxon minister Von Beust, one of the most ardent champions of greater national unity,