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 FRANCE 395 signments of officers to its divisions and bri- gades were at the same time pushed forward. Yet so defective had been the arrangements of the government that the outbreak of hostilities found the army in great part unprepared, while the preparations for their mobilization were in the most incomplete condition. The "army of the Rhine," the first portion of the active force which was in any way ready for service, was pushed forward as rapidly as possible to the Rhenish frontier; but most of its muni- tions and equipments, instead of going forward at the same time, followed at irregular inter- vals ; and the troops, arrived at their destina- tions, were subject in consequence to the most fatal delays. The whole strength of this first active army that appeared in the field did not exceed, by the highest estimates, 310,000 men; and of these probably not more than 270,000 constituted the "army of invasion," with the advance of which at the frontier actual hostilities began. In contrast with this state of affairs, the military system of Germany exhibited the great- est advantages. Not only did the immediate sup- port of the South German states (upon whose neutrality, if not upon their positive opposition to Prussia, Napoleon had undoubtedly relied) enable King William to bring into the field an active army more than one third greater than that of France ; but the perfect organization which prevailed especially in the Prussian, and in less degree throughout the whole German military force, enabled him to do what was of perhaps even more importance, concentrate immediately on the frontier a well disciplin- ed, perfectly trained, and completely prepared body of men; anticipating the movements of the enemy by taking advantage of his delay. Directly after the declaration of war, Germany found at its immediate disposition an active force of about 447,000 men, ready for the very beginning of hostile operations; and behind this were a first reserve of 188,000, and a second reserve of about 225,000, to say nothing of the Landwehr, or home militia. From the active force of 447,000, three armies were formed: the first, under Gen. von Steinmetz, took up its position (as the right wing) near Treves; the second, under Prince Frederick Charles, occupied the Rhenish Palatinate ; the third, un- der the crown prince of Prussia, assembled on the frontier of Baden, from Mannheim to Ras- tadt. While the German forces had assembled in these positions, the French army of the Rhine had, after the delays we have explained, arranged itself as follows : The 1st corps, under Marshal MacMahon, was posted near Strasburg; the 5th corps (Gen. Failly) further to the northward, along the frontier of the Palatinate, near Bitsch ; in the centre, the 3d corps, under Bazaine, as- sembled near Metz ; the 2d corps (Gen. Fros- sard) was pushed forward toward the Prussian frontier near St. Avoid ; the 4th corps (Gen. Ladmirault) was near Thionville, on the left wing ; reserves, under Bourbaki and Canrobert, were respectively at Nancy and at the camp of Chalons; the 7th corps, under Gen. Felix Douay, occupied the fortress of Belfort. In these positions the opposing armies stood ready for action in the last days of the month of July. A few skirmishes, of trifling importance, had taken place ; but no decisive movement had been made on either side. On the 28th Napoleon, who had from the beginning announced his intention to lead the army, left Paris with the prince imperial, and proceeded to Metz to take the actual command, having on the 23d ap- pointed the empress regent of France during his absence. On the day of his arrival at Metz he issued a proclamation to the troops. On July 31 King William left Berlin for the field, accompanied by his chief political and military advisers, Bismarck and Moltke ; he also issued proclamations of encouragement, one to the people of Germany, the other to the army. On Aug. 2 he established his headquarters tempo- rarily at Mentz. On the same day active hos- tilities began with the attack by three French divisions of Frossard's corps upon the garrison of Saarbriick, about 1,300 men, who were speed- ily driven back ; they retreated across the Saar to St. Johann, while the French occupied the heights before the first named town. But the results of the engagement were unimportant, nor did the French use even the slight advan- tage they had gained. Immediately afterward the three German armies began an advance, in which (as the general line of direction pur- sued tended toward the line of the Moselle and the French centre) the third army took the initiative, inasmuch as it, being the most south- erly in position, had the most ground to trav- erse in executing the contemplated movement. Beginning the march on Aug. 4 from their po- sition east of Landau, the forces of the crown prince pressed forward unmolested as far as the neighborhood of Weissenburg. Here their advance guard was attacked by the French under Gen. Abel Douay, and the first serious conflict of the war began; ending, after five hours of fighting, with the retreat of the French, who lost their general, while the Ger- mans occupied their abandoned position. On the 5th they continued the advance to Sulz. MacMahon, meanwhile, with the main body of his command, of which Douay's division had been but an advance guard, took up his posi- tion at Worth, and prepared for battle. On the morning of the 6th the greater part of the crown prince's forces had so far pushed forward that the armies stood opposing one another, and the German advance guard met the French left wing near Gorsdorf, some- what northwest of the position of the centre. The engagement that ensued there became gradually general, and spread along the whole line of the opposing armies. Worth, Elsass- hausen, and Froschweiler, the main points of MacMahon's position, were carried after des- perate resistance, and the defeat of the French terminated, shortly after four in the afternoon, in a retreat, and finally almost in a panic, the