Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IX.djvu/278

 266 INFANT INFANT. All persons are called infants, by the common law of England and America, un- til the age of 21, though in Vermont, Mary- land, Illinois, and perhaps some other states, by statute, women are of full age, for most purposes at least, at 18. An infant becomes an adult, or of full age, at the beginning of the last day of his 21st year, or the day before his 21st birthday, upon the ancient principle that the law knows no parts of a day, and when the last day of infancy begins, it is considered as ending. The most general principle in ref- erence to the legal condition of an infant is his inability to bind himself by his contract. The law asserts this inability for the sake of the in- fant, not as a restraint, but as a protection to him, and finds that upon the average of man- kind this protection should be extended until the age of 21. This inability being intended for his protection only, in legal phrase it is said to be his shield, and he must not use it as his sword. Because it is for his benefit, the first and most important exception is, that he may bind himself by his contract for necessa- ries ; for it might harm and could not help the child if he were unable to pledge his credit for shelter, clothes, or food. At first the excep- tion was confined to strict necessaries ; but it has been gradually extended, until now it is frequently said to mean all those things which it is perfectly proper for the infant to have, taking into view his age, his means, and his condition or circumstances. Thus he may make a valid bargain for clothes, or even orna- ments or furniture, as well as food and lodg- ing, more expensive than another may need, but not extravagant or superfluous for him. In England it has been held that instruction in reading and writing is among these necessaries for every one who could pay for it. In the United States it is held that the full benefit of a good school education is among these necessaries; and there seems to be no rea- son to doubt that a collegiate education will be held within the rule. So, as an infant may lawfully marry, necessaries for his wife and children may be lawfully contracted for by him. The line is drawn so as to exclude quite distinctly all trade or business bargains; for the whole legal doctrine of infancy rests on the assumption of the infant's inability to carry on the business of manhood until he has the ma- turity of at least 21 years. And it should be noticed that not all his contracts even for necessaries are, strictly speaking, valid. Thus, if he buys suitable food or clothing, and agrees to pay a certain price therefor, or gives his note therefor, he is not bound to pay that price or that note ; but if sued on the promise, he may defend so far as to show that the food and clothing were not worth as much as he prom- ised to pay, and then he will be held only for their value. But he cannot avoid his obliga- tion to pay their full value, merely because he promised to pay too much. Formerly the dis- tinction was, that an infant's contracts, not for necessaries, were entirely void, if the court saw that they could not be beneficial to him, but only voidable by him if this were doubtful. Now, however, the prevailing rule is, that all contracts of an infant, not for necessaries, are voidable by him, but that none are void ; be- cause all may be made valid by his ratification after full age, which could not be the case if they were wholly void at their inception. Any acts or words of affirmance on his part have the effect of this ratification, if they are made after majority ; but a mere acknowledg- ment that when he was an infant ho made such a promise, does not bind him when adult. The mere fact that, after full age, he does not dis- affirm his contract made in infancy, does not amount to a ratification ; but it may be made to have this significance and effect by circum- stances, and certainly has this effect if after majority he voluntarily continues for any con- siderable time in use, possession, and ownership of property acquired by his contract made while an infant. A distinction is taken here between an infant's real estate and his person- al estate ; and it is said that he may ratify a contract for the latter with much less of for- mal and positive ratification than is necessary for the confirmation of his conveyances of real estate. Still, a silent acquiescence in the pos- session of his grantee, if long enough, and with full knowledge of his rights, may amount to ratification. As the disability of an infant is only for his personal benefit, no one can take advantage of it but himself or his legal rep- resentatives. Therefore, if an adult makes a business contract with an infant, the adult is bound, although the infant is not. Thus, an infant may sue an adult for a breach of prom- ise of marriage ; but neither an adult nor an infant can sue an infant for such breach. So an infant may bring an action on a mercantile contract, although such an action cannot be brought against him. It is sometimes impor- tant to determine whether an infant is bound by the obligations which attach to property that he acquires by his contract. If he takes the property by direct operation of law, as by de- scent or marriage, there is no question, for the rule transit terra cum onere would apply, and be extended even to property that was not land. But if he acquires the property by his own act, the law may not be so certain. Thus, an in- fant who takes a lease of land, and holds pos- session nntil rent is due, is bound to pay the rent, like any other person ; but he may, when he will, disclaim the land and annul the lease, or rather suspend the lease ; for it is said that when he is of age he may avoid his disclaimer. So, if he buys stock in a corporation, he is lia- ble like an adult for assessments and calls, but may waive his contract and give up his stock. While an infant is protected against his con- tracts, he is not protected against his acts ; that is, he is answerable in like manner as any other person for the injury he inflicts by his wrong doing, excepting so far as actual infancy or im-