Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IV.djvu/424

 416 CHICKAHOMINY with only a .portion of which he undertook to storm the Union position. It is clear that he all along vastly underrated the strength of the enemy. "When he crossed the Chickahominy on the 26th, he supposed that the greater part of McClellan's army was on the east side ; but at Cold Harbor he himself had clearly a great preponderance of numbers, and he might fairly assume that the enemy was weak on the other side, otherwise he would have brought more men upon that field. At Frazier's farm the two divisions of Hill and Longstreet evidently were as strong as the force opposed to them ; and if they were too much exhausted to be brought into action, so too would be those with whom they had fought. The dispositions made by Lee for the attack clearly evince that he did not sup- pose himself to be confronted at Malvern hill by an effective force of more than 50,000 men. At 9 o'clock in the morning Jackson received orders to attack. Including D. H. Hill's divi- sion, which now formed a part of his command, he had, after deducting all losses, about 35,000 men. Hill, being on the confederate right, was opposite the Union left, where Hooker was post- ed. He suffered so severely from the artillery fire that he halted to reconnoitre, and found the enemy, as he reports, " strongly posted on a commanding hill, all the approaches to which could be swept by his artillery and guarded by swarms of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, and ravines. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an amphitheatre. We could only reach the first line of batteries by trav- ersing an open space of from 300 to 400 yards, exposed to a murderous fire of grape and canis- ter from the artillery, and musketry from the infantry. If that was carried, another and still more difficult remained in the rear. An ex- amination convinced me that an attack would be hazardous." The assault here was suspend- ed ; but Lee still persisted. He sent to each of his commanders a brief message, each word of which cost him a hundred men : " Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's lines. If they are broken, as is probable, Ar- mistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same." This second attack was to be made by Magruder with 20,000 men, comprising his own division and that of Huger, who had. been dis- placed. Magruder, after a long and weary march, came up, and found that Armistead, of Huger's division, had driven some skirmishers. The Union line was thought to be broken. " It is reported," Lee wrote to Magruder, "that the enemy is getting off; press forward your whole line, and follow up Armistead's success." Hill pressed forward with the others, and in an hour and a half his division, now reduced to 8,000, lost 836 killed and 1,373 wounded. Ma- gruder's attack failed to make any real impres- sion ; his men were mown down as they ad- vanced by a terrific fire of artillery and mus- ketry, which cost him some 500 killed and 2,000 wounded. The battle closed when dark- ness set in. On the confederate side it had been borne almost wholly by the divisions of D. H. Hill and Magruder, together not more than 28,000 strong. Jackson's own division was not fairly engaged, but being within dis- tant range of the Union artillery it lost 41 killed and 363 wounded. Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Holmes had no part in the battle. The Union loss at Malvern hill was about 375 killed and 1,800 wounded; the confederate loss, 900 killed and 3,500 wounded. The series of engagements from June 26 to July 1 has been styled the " sev- en days' battles," although there were really but six days. In all, including skirmishes, the Union loss appears to have been 1,582 killed and 7,709 wounded ; that of the confederates nearly twice as great, being 3,150 killed and 15,255 wounded. The former lost also 5,958 in missing, of whom 2,000 were the prisoners at Cold Harbor, and 2,500 in the hospitals at Savage's station ; the confederate loss in pris- oners was about 1,000. So that the entire Union loss was 15,249 ; confederate, 19,405. Had McClellan followed up the victory at Mal- vern hill within the next day or two, the con- federate army must have been annihilated. But instead of doing this, during the night follow- ing he abandoned his strong position, and re- treated to an unhealthy one at Harrison's land- ing, where he intrenched himself, and pleaded for reinforcements. At first he asked for 50,- 000, then for 100,000. Three weeks later he said if he could have 30,000 he might attack Richmond with a good chance of success, though he would then have an effective force of only 120,000, while he estimated that of the enemy at 200,000. So matters rested until the middle of August, when the Union army was withdrawn from the region of the Chicka- hominy and the James, and ordered to the Potomac. After the battle of Malvern hill the confederates remained for a week near the spot, and then returned to Richmond. Lee had accomplished his main purpose of raising the siege of the confederate capital. IX. SECOND COLD HARBOR. In the spring of 1864 the cur- rent of the war again rolled toward the Chick- ahominy. The command of the Union army was given to Grant, who encountered Lee in the bloody but indecisive battles of the Wil- derness, May 5, 6; Spottsylvania, May 11 ; and the North Anna, May 25. All this time the two armies had been verging toward the region where they had contended two years before. On June 2 Lee had taken up his position near Cold Harbor, while Grant was marching to- ward him from the same direction in which Jackson had marched upon Porter. The con- federate position was strongly intrenched. Lee could retreat no further, for behind him was the Chickahominy, now unbridged, and he could not cross it without winning a decisive battle. Grant, whose force was now about 150,000, while Lee had barely 50,000, resolved to attack the enemy in his intrenchinents ; if