Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IV.djvu/420

 412 CHICKAHOMINY sion of the confederates. Fair Oaks is some- what nearer Richmond than the Seven Pines, and here Johnston had posted himself to direct the general conduct of the whole battle. Sumner now took command here, and received the at- tack, which began at 4 o'clock, and lasted until twilight, when a vigorous charge hurled the confederates back in confusion ; and the action here closed at almost the same time with that at the Seven Pines. At this moment Johnston was severely wounded, and just afterward Richardson's division of Sumner's corps came upon the field. The bridge by which it had attempted to cross the Chickahominy had been found impassable, and it was necessary to go to that by which Sedgwick had already crossed. The division was posted, and the two armies bivouacked on the field, so near together that their pickets were within speaking distance. Johnston being disabled, the command of the confederates devolved upon Gen. G. W. Smith, who the next morning (June 1) decided not to attack at the Seven Pines; but the action was renewed near Fair Oaks, the confederate attack falling mainly upon Richardson's division, which had not as yet been engaged. Mean- while Hooker had come up from the left, and after an hour's hard fighting pushed the enemy from the woods by which they had been shel- tered. The confederates along the whole line retreated in confusion to Richmond. The ac- tions of the Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought by the confederates with a much small- er force than had been contemplated by John- ston; for Huger's division got lost in the swamps, and never appeared on the field. The entire attacking force was about 88,000. When strengthened by Sumner's two divisions, the entire Union force on that side of the Chicka- hominy was about the same ; but at the be- ginning of the action they were considerably scattered, while the confederates were massed upon the assailed points; so that on the 31st the confederates had a decided preponderance in action, but the federals had the advantage of slight intrenchments. The Union loss is officially stated at 890 killed, 8,627 wounded, 1,222 missing; 5,789 in all. The confederate loss was probably rather more, but no official statement appears to luive been made. John- ston says, u Longstreet reports the loss in his command at about 8,000; Smith reports his loss at 1,233," 4,233 in all ; but no mention is made of the loss in Hill's division, which is elsewhere stated to have been 2,500, which would give a total of 6,733. At Richmond these battles were considered a total defeat; and there is little doubt that had McClellan then moved his whole force against Richmond, the city would have fallen into his hands, for as yet it was defended by none of the works which within a few weeks became formidable. Smith held the command only two days, when, being partially disabled by a paralytic stroke, he was replaced by Gen. R. E. Lee. After the battle of Fair Oaks McClellan for some tiiiie devoted his attention to building new bridges across the Chickahominy. By June 20 eleven of these were measurably complete, of which seven were available for army transport. Earthworks of no great strength were also thrown up in front of the line on the west side of the river, and the bulk of the Union army was gradually transferred to that side. The position was in the midst of a swampy region, and notwithstanding considerable reenforce- ments, the number and strength of the army very considerably declined. On June 13 Stu- art with 1,500 cavalry started upon a daring raid clear around the Union army. He reached the White House, McClellan's main depot on the Pamunkey, destroyed some stores, and re- crossed the Chickahominy 14 m. below the Union left, losing only a single man in the ex- pedition. Lee, whose force had by this time become considerably augmented, now resolved upon an important movement. This was to cross the Chickahominy above the Union right, and attack the force on the east bank of the stream. Jackson, who had gathered a consid- erable army in the valley of the Shenandoah, was to move down and cooperate in this move- ment ; but to veil it, a considerable force was ostentatiously sent from Richmond toward the Shenandoah, giving the impression that a move- ment from that quarter upon Washington was in contemplation. The ruse only partially suc- ceeded. If the force at Richmond was weak- ened, the city would be by so much the more open to assault. This was now fairly contem- plated by McClellan. By June 24 four of his five corps were across the Chickahominy, leaving only Fitz John Porter with 86,000 men on the east bank. On the 25th the Union lines were pushed half a mile forward, and a desultory engagement occurred at a place known as King's school house, each side losing some 600 men. This was preparatory for a general for- ward movement which McClellan designed on the next day. At 5 o'clock he telegraphed to Washington that the affair was over ; he had gained his point, and all was quiet. An hour and a half later he sent a quite different de- spatch. Jackson's advance was at Hanover Court House ; Beauregard was at Richmond ; there were 200,000 men opposed to him, and he should probably be attacked the next day ; he would do all he could, and if his army was destroyed by overwhelming numbers, he could at least die with it ; if the result of the com- ing engagement should be disaster, he was not responsible for it. This was partly correct. Lee had also fixed upon the 26th for an offen- sive movement ; Jackson's whole force, not merely his advance, was at Hanover Court House. But Beauregard was in Alabama, not in Richmond ; and the confederate force, in- stead of being 200,000 strong, numbered bare- ly half as many. Instead of having to meet an overwhelming force, McClellan had a slight preponderance, having with him on the Chick- ahominy about 103,000 men present for duty,