Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IV.djvu/419

 CHICKAHOMINY to the river, and the bridge was nearly recon- structed. There was no military reason why the whole Union army should not then have crossed the Chickahominy by Bottom's bridge and the railroad bridge, and moved directly upon Richmond, where the confederate force numbered 54,000. But McClellan, who had considerably more than 100,000, greatly over- estimated the numbers opposed to him. He urged that McDowell, who had 32,000 near Fredericksburg, should be sent to him. This had indeed been promised ; but the operations of Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah alarmed the federal authorities, and McDowell was detained to prevent an anticipated attack upon Washington. II. HANOVER COURT HOUSE. Meanwhile McClellan learned on May 25 that there was a considerable body of confederates at Hanover Court House upon his right and partly in his rear. This force consisted of 13,000 raw troops from North Carolina, who were coming down from Gordonsville to Rich- mond. McClellan supposed that they were moving up from Richmond, and were "in a position either to reenforce Jackson, or to im- pede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to join us." Fitz John Porter was di- rected to dislodge this force on the 27th. A fight ensued, the results of which, says Mc- Clellan, " were some 200 of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small arms, and two railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing." The con- federates, however, reached Richmond, raising Johnston's force to 67,000. III. SEVEN PINES AND FAIR OAKS. On May 28 the Union force was thus posted: The corps of Heintzelman and Keyes, forming the left wing, were on the west side of the Chickahominy, massed checkerwise for a distance of 6 m. along the Williamsburg road. The stronger corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter, forming the right wing, were stretched for 18 m. along the east bank of the river. The two wings formed an acute-angled triangle of unequal sides, the apex being at Bottom's bridge. The distance from centre to centre of the wings was barely 5 m., but between them was the Chickahominy, over which there was then no practicable pas- sage except by Bottom's bridge. If the left wing were assailed in force, the right could come to its aid only by a march of about 23 m., which hi the condition of the roads at that time could not be made with artillery in less than two days. For a hostile commander with anything like an equal force, there were two courses open: He might throw himself upon the weaker left, with a probability of annihila- ting it ; or he could assail the extremity of the right wing, threatening its weakly guarded line of communications with West Point. Johnston at the end of May tried the first and most obvious plan, and failed by mere accident. Lee, a month later, tried the second plan, and succeeded, against all military probability. On May 30 Johnston learned the general position of the enemy ; he however supposed that only one corps instead of two was across the river, and presumed that he had but 20,000 to deal with, whereas the actual number was some- thing more than 30,000. The attack was to be made by the four divisions of Huger, Smith, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill, numbering about 50,000. During the afternoon and night of the 30th a violent storm swept over the region. The channel of the Chickahominy was already fuH to the brim, and the stream swollen by the rain would overflow swamp and bottom lands, preventing any aid being sent from the right wing to the left. The attack was to be made simultaneously at daybreak on the 31st. The storm delayed the movements of the troops; but by 8 o'clock .Longstreet was in position, waiting for the arrival of Huger, who did not make his appearance. Soon after noon he began the attack. Casey's division of Keyes's corps was three quarters of a mile in advance of the Seven Pines, its pickets being thrown a third of a mile further up to the edge of a wood. The confederates burst through this screen, forced back the pickets to the intrench- ments, where a stand was made, and the posi- tion was held for three hours against greatly superior numbers ; but both flanks being turned, Casey fell back to the Seven Pines. The con- federate attack here had been made by the division of Hill. Longstreet now pressed upon the Union centre and left. After an hour and a half of stubborn resistance, the Seven Pines was abandoned, and the troops fell back to a belt of wood, where Heintzelman succeeded in rallying about 1,800 men, who formed a firm front, and poured in a fire so deadly that the as- sault was checked. The confederates, who had forced the enemy back for two miles, now fell back a little, and passed the night in the camps which they had won ; the federals also fell back a mile to an intrenched camp. Meanwhile an- other action had been going on at Fair Oaks station, hardly a mile away. The noise of the battle had been heard across the Chickahomi- ny ; and McClellan, who was confined to his bed by illness, directed Sumner, who had just constructed two bridges over the Chickahominy, to hold himself in readiness to cross. The river had begun to rise, and the bridges were almost impassable ; many of the timbers were already floating. Two of Sumner's divisions, under Sedgwick and Richardson, were advanced to the head of the bridges, ready to cross the mo- ment orders were given. Late in the afternoon tidings came that the battle was going hardly, and Sumner was ordered to move. SedgwickV division, which got over the shaking bridge, dragged its artillery through the swamp, and, guided by the noise of the firing, moved upon Fair Oaks, where a single brigade of Couch's division of Heintzelman's corps, which had be- come separated from the main body, was mo- mently expecting an attack from Smith's divi-