Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IV.djvu/265

 CIIANCELLORSVILLE 257 disengaged force sweeping around would have enveloped the broken corps. They could not have carried off a gun, or got away except by creeping in squads through the forest. This seems to have been Hooker's plan ; but if so, no attempt was made to carry it out. Sickles, having exhausted his ammunition, sent his now useless artillery to the rear, and fell back a little to a line which he would hold by the bayonet. To his surprise he was not at once followed, and looking to his front, the enemy seemed to be broken up and defeated. Just at this moment French, with a single division, had struck Stuart's left and forced it back for a space. This was the only offensive move- ment made on that day by any part of Hooker's force. Stuart then rallied his whole force, and in turn repelled French. All this time Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and Mc- Laws, had assailed the Union centre, which Slocum was holding under the enfilading fire from the 30 guns at Hazle Grove, but always edging to the right to unite with Stuart. This junction was effected at 10 o'clock, when the battle there still hung in even scale. Both sides had suffered severely. Stuart, out of the 29,000 which he had in the morning, had lost 6,000 killed and wounded, and 1,500 prisoners; Sickles and French had lost 5,000 out of 22,000. The united confederate force, about 42,000 strong after its losses, converged toward Chan- cellorsville. In their way stood Sickles, French, and Slocum, with 10,000 less, while not two miles distant on either hand were Reynolds, Meade, and Howard, with 42,000, not a regi- ment of which moved at this extreme moment toward the scene of conflict. The stress of the combined attack fell upon Sickles. Five times the assault was repelled ; then all at once the whole Union line melted away, Sickles's corps first yielding the position. Couch had by this time assumed some sort of command, and in obedience to his orders the whole army fell back to the position which had been marked out during the previous night. As a defensive position to be held against a superior force, it was an excellent one. It formed a sharp curve, the apex nearly a mile back of Chancellorsville, and the sides stretching to the river and cover- ing the fords. Each flank was protected by a small stream, with densely wooded banks. The front could be approached only by a few rough roads. Lee was on the point of order- ing an attack, when he received tidings that Sedgwick had carried the heights at Freder- icksburg, and Early was unable to hold the new position which he had taken up. Lee sent four brigades which had suffered least, and a series of sharp conflicts ensued, neither side gaining any important advantage. Night coming on, both armies slept upon the field. No army ever stood in greater peril than did that of the confederates on Monday morning. All counted, it numbered less than 50,000 ef- fective men. Stuart and Anderson at Chan- cellors ville, with 30,000, confronted Hooker with 70,000 ; six miles to the east was McLawa with 10,000; three miles southward was Early with 9,000. Sedgwick had lost heavily, but he still had as many as McLaws and Early to- gether. It was hardly possible that Hooker would not discover the situation, and either attack Stuart with more than two-fold num- bers, or, leaving enough to hold him in check, fall upon McLaws, who would thus be crushed between two superior forces. Lee's only hope lay in dislodging Sedgwick, so he still further weakened Stuart by detaching Anderson with 10,000 men to the support of McLaws and Early, who had now effected a junction. The whole force, 27,000 strong, was at noon di- rected against Sedgwick, who with 18,000 assumed a defensive position. There was some skirmishing during the afternoon, but no serious action took place till 6 o'clock, when Ander- son forced Sedgwick's right, under Howe, back to a strong position near the liappahannock. Hooker meanwhile had sent contradictory or- ders to Sedgwick. In the morning he was told to recross the Rappahannock, if he thought best; at 11 o'clock he was directed to remain where he was. During the night he was again told to cross; a few minutes later an order countermanding this was sent; but it was not received until the former one had been obeyed, and it was too late to return, for the enemy had taken a position whicn commanded the bridge. But during the night Hooker had made up his mind to abandon his own position, and threw up new intrenchments to cover the bridges. Lee moved toward these, apparently intending to assault. But on Tues- day afternoon a fierce storm arose. The river rose rapidly, submerging the approaches to the bridges ; one of these was taken down to piece out the other, and over this the Union army retreated during the night without being perceived. An analysis of the official reports on both sides shows that the Union loss in this series of actions was about 17,000, of which there were 12,000 killed and wounded and 6,000 missing ; that of the confederates about 13,000, of which 10,300 were killed and wounded, and 2,700 missing. Of the Union loss in killed and wounded, about 7,000 were in the two corps of Sickles and Sedgwick ; 4,400 in those of Slocum, Couch, and Howard; and only 600 in those of Meade and Reynolds. Of the missing, 2,000 were from the corps of Howard, which numbered only 11,000. Of the confederate killed and wounded, 6,800 were in the three divisions under Stuart, which originally numbered 30,000. Hooker himself said that he had more men than he could use; that he "had fought no battle," because he could not get his men into position to do so ; and that he had failed in the enterprise which had been so brilliantly begun from causes " of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by any human sagacity or resources." The cavalry expedition under Stoneman was equally abortive. The main body went to within 30