Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IV.djvu/159

 CAVALRY 151 cavalry ever approach the irregulars of the nations of horse warriors of the East ; and yet the very worst of European regular cavalries has always defeated them in the field. From the defeat of the Huns at Chalons (451) to the se- poy mutiny of 1857, there is not a single in- stance where the splendid but irregular horse- men of the East have broken a single regiment of regular cavalry in an actual charge. Their irregular swarms, charging without concert or compactness, cannot make any impression upon the solid, rapidly moving mass. Their supe- riority can only appear when the tactical for- mation of the regulars is broken, and the com- bat of man to man has its turn ; but the wild racing of the irregulars toward their opponents can have no such result. It has only been when regular cavalry, in pursuit, have abandoned their line formation and engaged in single com- bat, that irregulars, suddenly turning round and seizing the favorable moment, have defeated them ; indeed, this stratagem has made up almost the whole of the tactics of irregulars against regulars, ever since the wars of the Parthians and the Romans. Of this there is no better example than that of Napoleon's dragoons in Egypt, undoubtedly the worst regular cavalry then existing, which defeated in every instance the most splendid of irregular horsemen, the Mamelukes. Napoleon said of them, two Mam- elukes were decidedly superior to three French- men; 100 Frenchmen were a match for 100 Mamelukes; 300 Frenchmen generally beat 300 Mamelukes ; 1,000 Frenchmen in every in- stance defeated 1,500 Mamelukes. However great may be the superiority in a charge of that body of cavalry which best preserves its tactical formation, it is evident that even this body must, after the successful charge, be com- paratively disordered. The success of the charge is not equally decisive on every point ; many men are irretrievably engaged in single combat or pursuit ; and it is comparatively but a small portion, mostly belonging to the second rank, who remain in some kind of line. This is the most dangerous moment for cavalry ; a very small body of fresh troops, thrown upon it, would snatch the victory from its hands. To rally quickly after a charge is therefore the criterion of a really good cavalry, and it is in this point that not only young but also otherwise experienced and brave troops are deficient. The British cavalry, riding the most spirited horses, are especially apt to get out of hand, and have almost everywhere suffered severely for it (e. g., at Waterloo and Balaklava). The pursuit, on the rally being sounded, is generally left to some divisions or squadrons, especially or by general regulations designated for this service ; while the mass of the troops re-form to be ready for all emergencies. For the dis- organized state, even of the victors, after a charge, is inducement enough to always keep a reserve in hand which may be launched in case of failure in the first 'instance ; and thus it is that the first rule in cavalry tactics has always been, never to engage more than a portion of the disposable forces at a time. This general application of reserves will explain the variable nature of large cavalry combats, where the tide of victory ebbs and flows to and fro, either party being beaten in his turn until the last disposable reserves bring the power of their unbroken order to bear upon the disordered, surging mass, and decide the action. Another very important circumstance is the ground. No arm is so much controlled by the ground as cavalry. Heavy, deep soil will break the gallop into a slow canter ; an obstacle which a single horseman would clear without looking at it, may break the order and solidity of the line; and an obstacle easy to clear for fresh horses will bring down animals that have been trotted and galloped about without food from early morning. Again, an unforeseen obstacle, by stopping the advance and entailing a change of front and formation, may bring the whole line within reach of the enemy's flank at- tacks. An example of how cavalry attacks should not be made was Murat's great charge at the battle of Leipsic. He formed 14,000 horsemen into one deep mass, and advanced on the Russian infantry which had just been repulsed in an attack on the village ofWachau. The French horse approached at a trot ; about 600 or 800 yards from the allied infantry they broke into a canter ; in the deep ground the horses soon got fatigued, and the impulse of the charge was spent by the time they reached the squares. Only a few battalions which had suffered severely were ridden over. Passing round the other squares, the mass galloped on through the second line of infantry, without doing any harm, and finally arrived at a line of ponds and morasses which put a stop to their progress. The horses were completely blown, the men in disorder, the regiments mixed and uncontrollable ; in this state two Prussian regi- ments and the Cossacks of the guard, in all less than 2,000 men, surprised their flanks and drove them all pell mell back again. In this instance there was neither a reserve for unseen emergencies, nor any proper regard for pace and distance; the result was defeat. The charge may be made in various formations. Tacticians distinguish the charge en muraille, when the squadrons of the charging line have none or but very small intervals between each other ; the charge with intervals, where there are from 10 to 20 yards from squadron to squad- ron ; the charge en echelon, where the succes- sive squadrons break off one after the other from one wing, and thus reach the enemy not simultaneously but in succession, which form may be much strengthened by a squadron in open column on the outward rear of the squad- ron forming the first echelon ; finally, the charge in column. This last is essentially opposed to the whole of the former modes of charging, which are all of them but modifications of the line attack. The line was the general and fun- damental form of all cavalry charges up to Na-