Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume II.djvu/775

 BLUCHER 755 prince of Wurtemberg, being successively attacked and routed by Napoleon, Prince Schwarzenberg retreated toward Troyes and sent word to Blilcher to join him, so that they might in concert give battle on the Seine. Blucher, strengthened by new reinforcements, immediately followed this call, entered Mery Feb. 21, and waited there the whole of the 22d for the dispositions of the promised battle. He learned in the evening that an applica- tion for a truce had been made to Napoleon, through Prince Liechtenstein, who had met with a flat refusal. Instantly despatching a confidential officer to Troyes, he conjured Prince Schwarzenberg to give battle, and even offered to give it alone if the main army would only form a reserve ; but Schwarzenberg, still more frightened by the news that Augereau had driven Gen. Bubna back into Switzerland, had already ordered the retreat upon Langres. Blucher understood at once that a retreat upon Langres would lead to a retreat beyond the Rhine ; and, in order to draw Napoleon off from the pursuit of the dispirited main army, resolved upon again marching straight in the direction of Paris, toward the Marne, where he could now expect to assemble an army of 100,000 men, Wintzingerode having arrived with about 25,000 men in the vicinity of Rheims, Bulow at Laon with 16,000 men, the remainder of Kleist's corps being expected from Erfurt, and the rest of Langeron's corps, under St. Priest, from Mentz. It was this second separation of Blucher from the main array that turned the scale against Napoleon. If the latter had followed the retreating main army instead of the advancing Silesian one. the campaign would have been lost for the allies. The passage of the Aube before Napo- leon had followed him, the only difficult point in Blucher's advance, he effected by construct- ing a pontoon bridge at Anglure on Feb. 24. Napoleon, commanding Oudinot and Mac- donald, with about 25,000 men, to follow the main army, left Herbisse on the 26th, together with Ney and Victor, in pursuit of the Silesian army. On the advice sent by Blucher that the main army had now but the two marshals before it, Schwarzenberg stopped his retreat, turned round upon Ondinot and Macdonald, and beat them on the 27th and 28th. It was Blucher's intention to concentrate his army at some point as near as possible to Paris. Mar- tnont with his troops was still posted at Se- zanne, while Mortier was at Chateau-Thierry. On Blucher's advance, Marmont retreated, and united on the 26th with Mortier at La Ferte- Bous-Jouarre, thence to retire with the latter upon Meaux. Blucher's attempt during two days to cross the Ourcq, and with a strongly advanced front to force the two marshals to battle, having failed, he was now obliged to march on the right bank of that river. He reached Oulchy-le-Chatean on March 2, learned in the morning of the 3d the capitulation of Soissons, which had been effected by Billow and Wintzingerode, and in the course of the same day crossed the Aisne and concentrated his whole army at Soissons. Napoleon, who had crossed the Marne at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, two forced marches behind Blucher, advanced in the direction of Chateau-Thierry and Fismes, and, having passed the Vesle, crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, March 6, after the recapture of Rheims by a detachment of his army. Blucher originally intended to offer battle behind the Aisne on Napoleon's passage of that river, and had drawn up his troops for that purpose. When he became aware that Napoleon took the direction of Fismes and Berry-au-Bac, in order to pass the Silesian army by the left, he decided upon attacking him from Craonne on the flank, in an oblique position, immediately after his debouching from Berry-au-Bac, so that Napoleon would have been forced to give battle with a defile in his rear. Having already posted his forces, with the right wing on the Aisne, with the left on the Lette, half way from Soissons to Craonne, he resigned this excellent plan on making sure that Napoleon had on the 6th been allowed by Wintzingerode to pass Berry-an-Bac unmo- lested, and had even pushed a detachment on the road to Laon. He now thought it necessa- ry to accept no decisive battle except at Laon. To delay Napoleon, who by Corbeny, on the causeway from Rheims, could reach Laon as soon as the Silesian army from Craonne, Blii- cher posted the corps of Vorontzoff between the Aisne and the Lette, on the strong plateau of Craonne, while he despatched 10,000 horse under Wintzingerode, to push on by Fetieux toward Corbeny, with the order to fall upon the right flank and rear of Napoleon as soon as the latter should be engaged in attacking Vorontzoff. Wintzingerode failing to execute the manoeuvre intrusted to him, Napoleon drove Vorontzoff from the plateau on the 7th, but himself lost 8,000 men, while Vorontzoff escaped with the loss of 4,700, and proved able to effect his retreat in good order. On the 8th Blacher had concentrated his troops at Laon, where the battle must decide the fate of both armies. Apart from his numerical superiori- ty, the vast plain before Laon was peculiarly adapted for deploying the 20,000 horse of the Silesian army, while Laon itself, situated on the plateau of a detached hill, which has on every side a fall of 12 to 30 degrees, and at the foot of which lie four villages, offered great ad- vantages for the defence as well as the attack. On the 9th the left French wing, led by Na- poleon himself, was repulsed, while the right wing, under Marmont, surprised in its bivouacs at nightfall, was so completely worsted that the marshal could not bring his troops to a halt before reaching Fismes. Napoleon, completely isolated with his wing, numbering 35,000 men only, and cooped up in a bad position, must have yielded before far superior numbers flush- ed with victory. But on the following morn- ing a fever attack and an inflammation of the