Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume I.djvu/784

 748 ARMY this latter arm to charge infantry sword in hand ; and the opinion of the irresistibility of a firin"- line became so prevalent that cavalry, too was taught to rely more on its carbines than on the sword. Thus, during this period, it often occurred that two lines of cavalry maintained a firing fight against each other the same as if they were infantry ; and it was con- sidered very daring to ride up to Avithin 20 yards of the enemy, fire a volley, and charge at a trot. Charles XIL, however, adhered to the rule of his great predecessor. His cavalry never stopped to fire ; it always charged, sword in hand, against anything opposing it, cavalry, infantry, batteries, and intrenchments, and always with success. The French, too, broko through the new system and recommenced re- lying on the sword only. The depth of cavalry was still further reduced from four to three. In artillery, the lightening of the guns, and the use of cartridges and case-shot, now became general. Another great change was that of the incorporation of this arm with the army. Hith- erto, though the guns belonged to the state, the men serving them were not soldiers, but formed a sort of guild, and artillery was con- sidered not an arm but a handicraft. The offi- cers had no rank in the army, and were con- sidered more related to master tailors and car- penters than to gentlemen. About this time, however, artillery was made a component part of the army, and divided into companies and bat- talions ; the men were converted into permanent soldiers, and the officers ranked with the in- funtry and cavalry. The centralization and per- manence of the armed contingent upon this change paved the way for the science of artil- lery, which under the old system could not de- velop itself. The passage from deep formation to line, from the pike to the musket, from the supremacy of cavalry to that of infantry, had thus been gradually accomplished when Fred- erick the Great opened his campaigns, and with them the classical era of line tactics. He formed his infantry three deep, and got it to fire five times in a minute. In his very first battle at Mollwitz, this infantry deployed in line, and repelled by its rapid fire all charges of the Austrian cavalry, which had just to- tally routed the Prussian horse ; after finishing with the cavalry, the Prussian infantry at- tacked the Austrian infantry, defeated it, and thus won the battle. Formation of squares against cavalry was never attempted in great battles, but only when infantry on the march was surprised by hostile cavalry. In a battle, the extreme wings of the infantry stretched round en potence when menaced by cavalry, and this was generally found sufficient. To op- pose the Austrian pandours, Frederick formed similar irregular troops, infantry and cavalry, but never relied on them in battle, where they were seldom engaged. The slow advance of the firing line decided his battles. Cavalry, neglected under his predecessor, was now made to undergo a complete revolution. It was formed only two deep, and firing, except on pursuit, was strictly prohibited. Horseman- ship, considered hitherto of minor importance, was now cultivated with the greatest atten- tion. All evolutions had to be practised at full speed, and the men were required to remain well closed up. By the exertions of Seydlitz, the cavalry of Frederick was made superior to any other then existing or ever existing before it; and its bold riding, close order, dashing charge, and quick rallying have never yet been surpassed. The artillery was considerably light- ened, so much that some of the heavy-calibred guns were not able to stand full charges, and had therefore to be abolished afterward. Yet the heavy artillery was still very slow and clumsy in its movements, owing to inferior and heavy carriages and imperfect organization. In battle, it took up its position from the first, and sometimes changed it for a second posi- tion, more in advance ; but manoeuvring there was none. The light artillery, the regimental guns attached to the infantry, were placed in front of the infantry line, 50 paces in advance of the intervals of the battalions; they ad- vanced with the infantry, the guns dragged by the men, and opened fire with canister at 300 yards. The number of guns was very large, from three to six guns per 1,000 men. The in- fantry, as well as the cavalry, were organized in brigades and divisions; but as there was scarcely any manoeuvring after the battle had begun, and as every battalion had to remain in its proper place in the line, these sub- divisions had no tactical influence. With the cavalry, a general of brigade might now and then, during a charge, have to act upon his own responsibility ; but with the infantry such a case could never occur. This line formation, infantry in two lines in the centre, cavalry in two or three lines on the wings, was a con- siderable progress upon the deep formation of former days. It developed the full effect of infantry fire, as well as of the charge of caval- ry, by allowing as many men as possible to act simultaneously ; but its very perfection in this point confined the whole army, as it were, in a strait waistcoat. Every squadron, battalion, or gun had its regulated place in the order of battle, which could not be inverted or in any way disturbed without affecting the efficiency of the whole. On the march, therefore, every- thing had to be so arranged that when the army formed front again for encampment or battle, every subdivision got exactly into its correct place. Thus, any manoauvres to be executed had to be executed with the whole army ; to detach a single portion of it for a flank attack, to form a particular reserve for the attack, with superior forces, of a weak point, would have been impracticable and faulty with such slow troops, fit only to fight in line, and with an order of battle of such stiff- ness. Then, the advance in battle of such long lines was necessarily executed with consider- able slowness, in order to keep up the align-