Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume I.djvu/49

 ABORTION 29 Lansdowne's act, did not differ substantially from the former, but further provided against rlu- use of instruments. The next statute pro- vided that whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, should use un- lawful means, &c., should be guilty of felony and liable to transportation for life or not less than 15 years. The present statute provides that every woman being with child who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself drugs, or use instruments, and whosoever with similar in- tent, whether the woman be or be not with child, shall use the like unlawful means, shall be guilty of felony, and liable on conviction to penal servitude for life or not less than three years, or to imprisonment. Supplying or pro- curing anything knowing that it is to be used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, is a misdemeanor. Of the more recent statutes in the United States, that of Maine (revision of 1871) provides that whoever administers, &c., to any woman pregnant with child, whether such child be quick or not, &c., if the act is done with intent to destroy the child, and the child is destroyed before birth, shall be pun- ished by imprisonment not more than five years or by fine not exceeding $1,000 ; and if done with intent to produce the miscarriage of such woman, by imprisonment not more than one year and by fine of not more than $1,000. The statute of Illinois of 1869 enacts that any person who by any means shall cause any pregnant woman to miscarry, or shall attempt to procure or produce such miscarriage, shall be liable to imprisonment not less than two nor more than ten years ; and if by any such attempt the death of the woman shall be caused, the party offending shall be guilty of murder, and be punished as the law requires for that offence. But this crime may be com- mitted, as has already been shown by the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw, independently of any statutory provision to that effect. In Missouri (revision of 1870) the wilful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother which would be murder if it resulted in the death of the mother, is manslaughter in the first degree ; and every person who shall use means, &c., on a woman pregnant with a quick child, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the act is necessary to pre- serve life, &c., shall, if the death of such child or mother ensue from the means so employed, be guilty of manslaughter in the second de- gree ; and every person who shall wilfully ad- minister to or use means on any pregnant woman with intent thereby to procure an abor- tion, unless necessary to save life, or advised by physicians to be so necessary, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is punishable by imprison- ment for one year or by fine of $500, or by both. In Pennsylvania the statute (1860) pro- vides that if any person shall unlawfully use means on any woman pregnant or quick with child,, or supposed to be so, with intent to pro- cure the miscarriage of the woman, and she, or any child of which she may be quick, shall die in consequence of such unlawful acts, the offender is guilty of a felony, and is liable to fine not exceeding $500 or to be imprisoned not exceeding seven years ; and it is further provided that if any person, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, shall use unlawful means upon her, he shall also be guilty of felony and subject to a fine not ex- ceeding $500 and to imprisonment for not more than three years. The latest statutes for example, those of New Jersey, Illinois (1869), Kansas (1868), and New York (1869) do not require that the woman be quick with child, but only that she be "pregnant" or "with child." The Ohio statute of 1867 is to the same effect, but differs in its phraseology from the statutes of any of the other States. It pro- vides that any person who shall administer or advise to be administered to any woman preg- nant with a vitalized embryo or foetus, at any stage of utero-gestation, any medicine or sub- stance, or employ any other means, with intent thereby to destroy such vitalized embryo or foetus, unless necessary or advised by physi- cians to be necessary to save the life of the mother, shall, in case of the death of such embryo or foetus or mother in consequence thereof, be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and punishable by imprisonment from one to seven years. In Massachusetts, by the present statute, the offender is guilty of felony if the mother die in consequence of the act, and is liable to imprisonment from five to twenty years ; and if she does not die, is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by fine and im- prisonment not more than seven years. The present statute of New York was enacted in 1869, superseding that of 1846. This earlier -act declared that every person who should ad- minister to any woman pregnant with a quick child any drug, or use any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, should in case of the death of such child or of such mother be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. The act of 1869 omits the word "quick," saying "with child," and with regard to the intent substitutes the words " with intent thereby to produce the miscar- riage of any such woman ;" and it preserves the provision that in case the death of such child or of such woman be thereby produced, the offender shall be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. It will be observed that the omission of any criterion of quickening, and the provision respecting the death of the child, make the crime possible from the very earliest stage of gestation. Under the former statutes it was also an essential element of the crime that there should be an intent to destroy the child; now that intent is immaterial, and if there was the mere intent to procure the mis- carriage, and the death of the child is pro- duced, the crime is committed. The statutes