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 say they have put one small ball in the air;” and, he added, “at this moment you [don’t] have to fear the intelligence aspects of this.” By tying the US space program to his freedom of space policy, Eisenhower had hoped to impress upon the world the peaceful intent of the US. However, whatever propaganda advantage the United States had gained by such peaceful remonstrations was overshadowed when the USSR was “first in space.” Interestingly, the launch of Sputnik, while sharpening the focus of the heretofore essentially academic discussion of sovereignty in outer space, did not result in any immediate international convention. Additionally, the Soviets reversed their position of asserting sovereignty over outer space above their territory. When confronted with their apparent reversal, the Soviets adopted temporarily the rather specious position (clearly contrary to the laws of physics and astronautics) that it had not violated any other nation’s sovereignty since Sputnik had not flown over any nation’s territory but instead the territories had passed under Sputnik. Eisenhower’s hidden stalking-horse agenda of obtaining free passage in space for intelligence gathering devices had been achieved. The US was not alone in failing to object to Sputnik’s overflight of its territory. No other country objected to the overflight of their territory either, thus establishing the first custom in outer space law, that is, the free flight of objects in outer space. The USSR, in its exuberance over its successful satellite launches, made no distinction between scientific and intelligence-gathering devices (nor did any other country). When countries failed to object to subsequent satellite overflights, the custom became firmly established. Because of Sputnik I, ICAO President Walter Binaghi wrote to Nelson B. David, the US representative on the ICAO Council, inquiring whether it was time to finally consider the issue of outer space sovereignty. He also inquired as to the ICAO’s appropriateness as the vehicle to do so. Binaghi’s inquiry was referred to the ACC by David. Robert Kinsey, secretary of the ACC Legal Division, informed the members of the division of Binaghi’s letter and set the matter for consideration at the next meeting. On 8 November 1957, the ACC’s Legal Division, with the Air Force concurring, approved a position in response to Binaghi’s inquiry. Before forwarding this response, the division reviewed the earlier US