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 exploration, disarmament, and the creation of international law, providing that space was free from national military rivalries. As noted earlier, underlying Eisenhower’s space-for-peace policy was his resolve to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Following the blueprint provided by the Surprise Attack Panel, he sought to obtain a free passage for intelligencegathering satellites in outer space as being essential to preventing a surprise attack. Therefore, while publicly articulating a space-for-peace policy, Eisenhower maneuvered to obtain freedom of passage for intelligence-gathering devices in outer space. He saw no inconsistency in his stalking-horse strategy. While the product of such intelligence-gathering satellites could clearly be used to facilitate warfare by identifying targets, Eisenhower perceived that the satellites were passive not “offensive” and argued that it was his intent that they be used to maintain peace. As part of his “open skies” proposal, Eisenhower offered to share such intelligence with the Soviets much the same as President Ronald W. Reagan would propose 30 years later. Eisenhower hoped that the free passage of IGY scientific satellites in outer space would establish the precedent of free passage for subsequent intelligence-gathering satellites. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration worked to ensure that an earth satellite project was included as part of the US IGY program. While maneuvering to include a scientific satellite system as part of IGY. President Eisenhower waited until the Geneva summit with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in July 1955 to propose the US open skies position. Eisenhower suggested that as part of open skies the United States and USSR provide facilities from which aerial photography taken of the other could be shared, thereby precluding any surprise attack. The USSR rejected the open skies proposal as a ploy for gathering target data. The USSR stuck to its claim of absolute sovereignty of all its space (air and outer) over its homeland. Upon returning to the United States from Geneva, President Eisenhower announced officially on 29 July 1955 that the here-to-fore undisclosed US IGY satellite project was to be powered by nonmilitary boosters that had not yet been built. In September 1955 the Navy’s proposal to manage the “civilian” IGY booster program was approved. Neither President Eisenhower nor his advisers appear to have appreciated how much their idealistic insistence on developing nonmilitary boosters would delay the American satellite project and what the impact of that delay would be. No IGY boosters were ever fully developed and