Page:The Air Force Role In Developing International Outer Space Law (Terrill, 1999).djvu/21

 In drafting its space policy, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated an ambivalent desire to be first in space. Such ambivalence by Eisenhower was not unique to outer space but was generally the hallmark of Eisenhower’s approach to problem solving, particularly and ironically regarding issues relating to foreign affairs. For example, Eisenhower pursued a space-for-peace policy and proposed to rely upon nonexistent “nonmilitary” boosters as the launch vehicle. As drafted by Air Force secretary Donald A. Quarles, this policy declared that the IGY satellite program would not interfere with intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missile (ICBM and IRBM) programs. The US satellite would be launched for “peaceful purposes” and would assist in establishing the right of unimpeded overflights in outer space. This decision was confirmed by the National Security Council (NSC Directive 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on US Scientific Satellite Program) on 26 May and approved by President Eisenhower on 27 May 1955. However, the administration did not immediately communicate this decision to themilitary services, one of which was to be assigned to manage the development of the boosters. By pursuing a space-for-peace policy, President Eisenhower, at least publicly, began a persistent effort by his administration to marry space