Page:The Air Force Role In Developing International Outer Space Law (Terrill, 1999).djvu/20

 Further, the position of these critics was diametrically opposed to Eisenhower’s goal of achieving freedom of passage for intelligence gathering satellites in outer space as had been initially envisioned by the Surprise Attack Panel. After Dulles’ response, the Air Force disputed that its balloons were intended for anything other than charting the jet stream. The Air Force cover story stating that the balloons “were being used for weather research also made reference to the  (IGY).” When the Air Force later proposed to release even higher flying balloons in mid-March 1956, Eisenhower informed Gen Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff, that he (Eisenhower) “was not interested in any more balloons” and terminated any further launches. In the meantime, a more promising avenue of gathering information, the U-2, was becoming operational and would make its maiden flight five months after Eisenhower ordered an end to the balloon flights. By 1956 the practices of the Air Force and others involved in the balloon “experiments” and the contemplation of an earth orbiting observation system had focused substantial attention on and begun a dialogue regarding international outer space law. “Space-for-Peace” and the International Geophysical Year Driven by the advent of IGY-1 July 1957-31 December 1958-and other considerations, the United States and the USSR increased their focus on their respective space programs. On 15 April 1955 the USSR announced the establishment of its Special Commission for Interplanetary Communications, making reference to a globe circling satellite program. In 1955 the US was completing the formulation of its first space policy, but it did so in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The United States assumed that its space program was technologically superior to the USSR’s space program. Indeed, the US was far ahead of the Soviets in miniaturizing its warhead devices (which fact was highly classified at that time); however, as discussed later, this US advantage was to become a double-edged sword.