Page:The Air Force Role In Developing International Outer Space Law (Terrill, 1999).djvu/101

 approach, space related technology has flourished under the present legal regime and, when appropriate, has been transferred to the civilian sector.

This may not have occurred if certain officials of the Air Force had not stuck by their beliefs. The Air Force individuals who attended the "skull sessions" of the Air Coordinating Committee were particularly effective in preserving the ad hoc approach. Even when under pressure from the others to capitulate, particularly given the growing international pressure at the United Nations for the codification of space law, Air Force officials stood their ground. By remaining firm, the Air Force kept the Air Coordinating Committee, and accordingly the United States, in accord with the Air Force position supporting the ad hoc approach to the development of the law.

The existence of the ACC provided a forum within which divergent views from varying levels of authority (in particular midlevel officials) from many government agencies could be brought to bear on an issue. At the ACC, representatives of agencies below today's policy decision-making level felt free to speak their minds and to advocate, argue, and discuss current issues. In essence, the ACC provided a forum from which long-term analysis and planning emerged from the "adversarying" of the current issues among agencies and departments. Interdepartmental working groups and coordination typified by the ACC are more rarely used today. Instead coordination, in general, has degenerated to passing paper.

After the demise of the ACC, coordination of various forms of paper (for example, position papers, memoranda, briefing papers, and other staff documents) became the predominant vehicle to obtain interdepartmental input regarding the proposed US position for the various outer space treaties. By replacing face-to-face discussions and the type of dialogue typical of ACC meetings with paper coordination, effective and efficient crystallization of concepts, plans, doctrine, or policy is lost. Given the present irregular use of such interdepartmental adversarying of current issues and the conversion of previously mid and upper-level career positions to policy positions (that is, politically appointed positions) that has taken place over the past 30 years, the by- product of such adversarying, has been negatively affected. That is not to say that those with political agendas should not have input, but only that the political input should be layered upon or be part of the metamorphosis of an analysis that was not initially driven by political concerns. Face-to-face, in-depth brainstorming by those without a political agenda must not