Page:The Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara.pdf/13

Rh mind, of condensing a whole argument in one Word, by what is called the vivartavâda or what may roughly be described as the theory of assumption. The Upanishads declare that everything proceeds from Brahma, which Ś‬aṅkara interprets by this theory to mean that the universe is of Brahma just as the snake, which a rope is believed to be, is of that rope. It is no more a result of it, but it exists by it. The Adhyâsa or false impression just explained, born of ignorance which is a synonym of Prakriti and is therefore eternal, is the cause of such false assumption. Right knowledge dispels this illusion, as sufficient light explains the nature of the snake; ‬and all is Brahma — eternal love and joy.

The word illusion puts us in mind of the theory of Mâyâ, often laid at the door of Ś‬aṅkara in its illogical, not to say absurd, aspect. Because Ś‬aṅkara uses, though rarely, the word Mâyâ or illusion, and advocates as strongly as he can the vivartavâda. Some have thought that he regards the whole phenomena of matter as an illusion, a phantasm, not existing per se. They carry this kind of reasoning to its consequences and reduce even the substratum of such illusions or dreams to an illusion again; and confront the Vedântins with the impossibility of reconciling the two contraries Jñâna (Brahma) and (Mäyä), waking and dreaming as existing in one place at the same time. Ś‬aṅkara teaches the doctrine of Mâyâ no doubt, it is in fact the very corollary of his vivartavâda, but he never teaches it with a vengeance. He says that Nâma and Rûpa, name and form, are Mâyâ, and we should have no faith in them. One of the best interpreters of the latter Vedânta, Bhâratîtîrtha, says the same thing:

'Intercourse implies five attributes and no more: Existence, knowledge, bliss, form, and name; ‬the first three are Brahma, the last two, Jagat (Mâyâ).' Even the Chhândogya says nothing different: