Page:Thaler v. Perlmutter, Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.pdf/27

 fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object.”). Plaintiff’s invitation to apply physical property doctrines such as accession and first possession to copyright would contravene the statutory scheme and upend the foundations of copyright law.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s common law argument fails because it is foreclosed by the text and structure of the Act. Plaintiff suggests that because the Act references “operation of law,” that language permits common law principles to determine what material is protected by copyright. Dkt. 16 at 20. But “operation of law” is only mentioned as relevant for transfers of an existing copyright—not for whether a copyright exists in the first place. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (“ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law”); id. § 204(a) (copyright transfers must be in writing unless transfer is “by operation of law”). Section 102(a), the subject matter of copyright, and § 201(a), which provides that copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the work,” do not reference “operations of law.” And, because Congress deliberately used “operations of law” elsewhere in the Act, its omission in the Act’s discussion of the subject matter of copyright and initial creation