Page:Thaler v. Perlmutter, Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.pdf/11

 evidence, or if the agency has made a clear error in judgment.’” Ashton v. United States Copyright Office, 310 F. Supp. 3d 149, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Hagelin v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 411 F.3d 237, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The Office’s decision to refuse registration of the Work was based on established legal standards, including the text of the Copyright Act, judicial interpretation of the Act, and the Office’s own public guidance and practices. The legal inquiry into whether a particular work can be registered begins with the text of the statute. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., (the Act) grants copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection confers certain exclusive rights, including the rights to copy and distribute the work. Id. § 106. The Act defines categories of works of authorship in which copyright protection can subsist, including “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” id. § 102(a), which include “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings.” Id. § 101. Defendants do not dispute that the Work—a two-dimensional work of visual art—falls within the categories of works of authorship identified in the Act. See id. But that is not the end of the inquiry. Even if the Work qualifies as a category of work within the scope of the statute, the Act protects only “original works of authorship” that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Id. § 102(a). Accordingly, the Office will refuse registration for works that are not “original works of authorship,” not fixed, or are subject to statutory exclusions.