Page:Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.pdf/58

18 , dissenting On the contrary, we have previously refused to interpret enactments like the 1988 safe-harbor provisions in such a way. Our decision in O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U. S. 79 (1996)—also ignored by the Court today—is instructive. In that case, the question was whether a provision of the Internal Revenue Code excluding a recovery for personal injury from gross income applied to punitive damages. Well after the critical provision was enacted, Congress adopted an amendment providing that punitive damages for nonphysical injuries were not excluded. Pointing to this amendment, a taxpayer argued: "Why . . . would Congress have enacted this amendment removing punitive damages (in nonphysical injury cases) unless Congress believed that, in the amendment’s absence, punitive damages did fall within the provision's coverage?" Id., at 89. This argument, of course, is precisely the same as the argument made in this case. To paraphrase O'Gilvie, the Court today asks: Why would Congress have enacted the 1988 amendments, providing safe harbors from three types of disparate-impact claims, unless Congress believed