Page:Tetrachordon - Milton (1645).djvu/37

 that consent alone, though copulation never follow, makes the mariage. Therefore to consent lawfully into one flesh, is not the formal cause of Matrimony, but only one of the effects. The Civil Lawyers, and first Justinian or Tribonian defines Matrimony a conjunction of man and woman containing individual accustom of life. Wherin first, individual is not so bad as indissoluble put in by others: And although much cavil might be made in the distinguishing between indivisible and individual, yet the one tak'n for possible, the other for actuall, neither the one nor the other can belong to the essence of mariage; especially when a Civilian defines, by which Law mariage is actually divorc't for many causes, and with good leav, by mutual consent. Therfore where conjunction is said, they who comment the Institutes, agree that conjunction of minde is by the Law meant, not necessarily conjunction of body. That Law then had good reason attending to its own definition, that divorce should be granted for the breaking of that conjunction which it holds necessary, sooner then for the want of that conjunction which it holds not necessary. And wheras Tuningus a famous Lawyer excuses individual as the purpos of Mariage, not always the success, it suffices not. Purpos is not able to constitute the essence of a thing. Nature her self, the universal Mother, intends nothing but her own perfection and preservation; yet is not the more indissoluble for that. The Pandects out of Modestinus, though not define, yet well describe Mariage, the conjunction of male and female, the society of all life, the communion of divine and human right: which Bucer also imitates on the fifth to the Ephesians. But it seems rather to comprehend the several ends of Mariage, then to contain the more constituting cause that makes it what it is.

That I therefore among others (for who sings not Hylas) may give as well as take matter to be judg'd on, it will be lookt I should produce another definition then these which have not stood the tryal. Thus then I suppose that Mariage by the natural and plain order of Gods institution in the Text may be more demonstratively and essentially defin'd. ''Mariage is a divine institution, joyning man and woman in a love fitly dispos'd to the helps and comforts of domestic life. A divine institution''. This contains the prime efficient cause of Mariage; as for consent of Parents and Guardians, if seems rather a concurrence than a cause; for as many, that marry are in thir own power as not; and where they are not thir own, yet are they not subjected beyond Rh